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7.82 The practical management of electronic evidence
tailored to law enforcement and prosecution functions, and these agencies are
funded to ensure the systems are upgraded and the agencies can keep pace with
developments in technology. With prosecution agencies bearing the primary
responsibility for preparation of each case, they are able to do so without
having to negotiate with or be constrained by the requirements of opposing
parties in the way lawyers in civil cases must.
.;
CANADA
7.83 Canada is a bilingual and bi-jurisdictional country. Most provinces and
territories are mainly English speaking and have common law as the basis for
their legal system. The exception is the province of Quebec which is governed
by civil law and where the majority speaks French. However, it must be noted
that Quebec civil law has been substantially affected by common law, in
particular with respect to discovery rules. The latter are closer to common law
discovery rules than they are from, for instance, French civil law. Another
important factor for the review of the management of digital evidence i&
Canada is the existence of different jurisdictions within each province. Canada
has a federal system, with a national court system and court systems in each
province and territory. The federal courts have limited authority and focu$
mainly on immigration, intellectual property, maritime and other 'national
concerns'. The courts of appeal, the superior (or supreme, depending on the
province or territory) courts, the provincial courts and administrative tribunals
in each province hear the bulk of the cases. Provincial laws dictate the practice
of civil litigation, and discovery is governed by rules of civil procedure or, in
Quebec, the Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.).
E-discovery
7.84 In order to succeed at trial, a litigator today needs more than merely to
know the rules of procedure and evidence. It is important for the lawyer, and
their team, to understand the processes through which documents will be
identified, preserved, collected, processed, reviewed and produced. The means
and strategies used to handle documents during discovery can have a
significant effect on delays, costs and risks, as well as the results of the
discovery phase.
Procedures and plans
7.85 Generally, lawyers are prolific in the development of policies and
protocols for their clients. However, when it comes to e-discovery, and more
generally any process, it is difficult to find a realistically implementable policy
or protocol. This can be explained by the fact that law firms usually do not
have similar documentation and workflows internally. Accordingly, they are
unable to develop practical, repeatable and defendable solutions for their
clients, who are forced to rely on their outside counsel on an ad hoc and
case-by-case basis.
Preservation of evidence
7.86 The majority of cases start, for both parties, with an obligation to
preserve the potentially relevant evidence. As stated in principle 3 of the
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Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic Documents Production
('Sedona Canada Principles'), 'as soon as litigation is reasonably anticipated,
parties must consider their obligation to take reasonable and good faith steps
to preserve potentially relevant electronically stored information.' Even if this
might appear to be an easy task, it cannot be overstressed that it is an
important challenge for most parties. This is particularly true for sophisticated
organisations which have a complex IT infrastructure or decentralised information management systems. Lawyers should take the lead on this issue before
a case arises in order to help their client develop a defendable approach to
litigation hold implementation. It is also a good opportunity for outside
counsel to familiarise himself or herself with the IT infrastructure and
information management practices of their client. As reminded by the
Saskatchewan court of Appeal1, 'A party is under a duty to preserve what he
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in an action. The process of
discovery of documents in a civil action is central to the conduct of a fair trial
and the destruction of relevant documents undermines the prospect of a fair
trial.' Being aware of this general principle is not enough. In order to
reasonably know what is relevant to an action, the lawyer must be able to
establish where the information is, both on and outside the network, as the
case may be. In terms of locating the potentially relevant information,
Canadian organisations normally do not have an effective search engine to
seek documents on their servers, computers, intelligent telephones, portable
media, and such like. Accordingly, it is important to have a strategy to identify
information defensibly that needs to be preserved.
1

Doust v Schatz, 2002 SKCA 129 at [27].

7.87 However, this merely enables the lawyer to identify what still needs to be
done to preserve the potentially relevant information. In Canada, most
organisations perform a collection-preservation1 whereby the information that
needs to be preserved is collected, using different technologies in order to
ensure that the potentially relevant information is not altered in any way.
Preservation is increasingly performed on site, ie information is preserved in
the location where it was originally stored. This approach can be helpful under
certain circumstances, but there is a risk that the evidence will be altered,
destroyed or lost by custodians, automation or hardware malfunction if the
onsite hold is not implemented properly.
1

C7BC World Markets Inc. v Genuity Capital Markets, 2005 CanLII 3944 (ON S.C.).

7.88 Today, collection-preservation tends to be undertaken manually by
providing the custodians with a collection guide and adequate training and
support to enable them to go through their documents and identify the ones
that should be collected. Under such circumstances, unless discovery technologies are used, this means drag-and-dropping the documents to a snared drive
or server where the data is subject to being hashed and converted to an
unalterable format. However, where this method is used, it is essential to
understand the effect on the documents and their metadata.
7.89 The obligation to preserve is on the producing party. Owing to the
dynamic nature of electronically stored information, any delay in preserving
potentially relevant information may increase the risk of spoliation. For that
reason, it is necessary for counsel quickly (ideally in advance) to identify the
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7.89 The practical management of electronic evidence
types of electronic information that are routinely updated or destroyed, such
as databases, email servers, backup tapes, and such like. Proportionality is an
important precept of Canadian discovery, and counsel should determine the
ambit of the preservation as early as possible1 by assessing:
'the nature and scope of the litigation, including the importance and complexity of
the issues, interest and amounts at stake; the relevance of the available electronically stored information; its importance to the court's adjudication; and the costs,
burden and delay that may be imposed on the parties to deal with electronically
stored information'2.
1
2

Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic Discovery, Principle 3.
Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic Discovery, Principle 2.

Litigation hold letter
7.90 As mentioned above, the obligation of preservation is recognised across
Canada, except in Quebec where some lawyers still contend that there is no
such obligation, based on the absence of any written rule to that effect in
the Code of civil procedure1. Without entering into the details of their sophism,
suffice it to say that the Supreme Court of Canada recognised the existence of
a preservation obligation in Quebec as early as 18962. It is becoming
increasingly common, and important, for parties in Canada, and particularly
in Quebec, to send a litigation hold letter to the opposing party. This is
particularly true in major cases with sophisticated parties. The letters generally
specify the information and media that should be preserved3. The letter enables
one party to alert the opposing party to its preservation obligations in an
electronic environment. More particularly, it puts the other side on notice not
to alter any evidence, and the custodians of the electronic evidence (often IT
managers) who control databases or servers also need to be made aware of
their necessary involvement in ensuring the organisation complies with its
obligations. The hold letter is also used to ensure the preservation of
information held by third parties that would otherwise not be aware of the
existence of litigation and hence of a preservation obligation.
1
2
3

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25.
St-Louis v The Queen, 1896 vol. XXV SCR 649.
For
examples
of
such
letters,
visit
the
http://www.oba. org/En/publicaffairs_en/E-Discovery/default.aspx.

OBA

website

at

Meet and confer
7.91 The notion of 'meet and confer' was introduced in Canada from the
United States by The Sedona Conference. Principle 4 of the Sedona Canada
Principles states:
'Counsel and parties should meet and confer as soon as practicable, and on an
ongoing basis, regarding the identification, preservation, collection, [processing,]1
review and production of electronically stored information.'

At the present time, it remains unusual for parties and their counsel to meet
and confer about their respective e-discovery obligations. Many lawyers are
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under the impression that meeting and conferring is against the rationale of the
adversarial system. In addition, they are afraid that they might inadvertently
share their strategy with the opposing party. It is possible that the enactment
of the new Ontario rules of civil procedure in January 2010, or their equivalent
in Alberta and British Columbia, will force counsel to adopt a more collaborative approach. However, considering what little effect rule 16.06(3)2 of the
Nova Scotia Rules of Civil (N.S.R.C.P.) Procedure has had so far on 'meet and
confer' sessions since its enactment in January 2009, it is doubtful that it will
change counsels' behaviour in the near future without leadership from the
bench.
1
2

Added by the author.
Nova Scotia Rules of Civil Procedure: 'All parties must negotiate in good faith for an
agreement under Rule 16.05 as soon as possible after being notified of an inability to fulfill a
default duty or comply with a default Rule.'

7.92 In Quebec, a similar approach was taken. Section 4.1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) states: 'Subject to the rules of procedure and the time
limits prescribed by this Code, the parties to a proceeding have control of their
case and must refrain from acting with the intent of causing prejudice to
another person or behaving in an excessive or unreasonable manner, contrary
to the requirements of good faith'. However, as in the other provinces, the
reality is that lawyers merely negotiate dates to be put on a standard schedule
without truly thinking about the effect of discovery on the case. This attitude
will undoubtedly change with the enactment of the new rules of procedure
which substantially review old practices.
Data gathering
7.93 Electronic discovery in Canada has been led by the commercial service
providers. For obvious reasons, the standard capture method has been full
forensic imaging. The situation is so extreme that the N.S.R.C.P. requires
parties, as the default collection method, to 'exactly copy'1, which is defined as
copying electronic information in such a way that the copy is a mirror image
of the original in a computer, storage medium, or other source. Nevertheless,
there has been an increase in logical collection. However, because of the poor
information management in most Canadian organisations, logical collection
remains difficult, because it is hard to know where to find potentially relevant
data. In most cases, parties rely on the notions of proportionality and
accessibility to justify their gathering strategy. Generally, the tendency is to
take a comprehensive approach.
1

Nova Scotia Rules of Civil Procedure, s 14.02(1).

Review
7.94 The process of document review in Canada aims at identifying the
relevant documents that must be produced, and perhaps more importantly, the
confidential information that must not. As previously mentioned, throughout
Canada but for Quebec, production is a positive obligation that parties have
to disclose all potentially relevant information to the opposing party. Accordingly, the megabyte, gigabyte or terabyte of data must be reviewed to identify
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which documents should be disclosed to the opposing party. This task is
usually performed in two phases: a first relevancy pass where a high-level
screening is performed, normally by junior lawyers, and a second pass during
which more senior counsel audit the relevancy tags and make the final decision
with respect to confidentiality issues, mainly solicitor-client and litigation
privileges.
7.95 The solicitor-client privilege, a quasi-constitutional right in Canada, is
treated very seriously, in that parties try to prevent any disclosure of privileged
material out of fear of waiving it. In the case of Air Canada v Westjet
Airlines Ltd1, due to the important volume of documents that needed to be
reviewed, Air Canada sought an order confirming that if any privileged
documents were inadvertently produced by the parties during its document
production, such productions would not constitute a waiver of privilege, and
that if documents were produced by the parties during the document production process, such production would not constitute an admission of the
relevance of all or a portion thereof. The motion was dismissed.
1

2006 CanLII 14966 (ON S.C.).

7.96 In Quebec, since the parties only need to produce what they intend to use
during the trial, as well as the relevant information that the opposing party
requests, the document review stage can normally be handled by the lawyer in
charge of the case because of the minimal number of documents. However,
Quebec courts are currently enlarging the scope of discovery to have a better
understanding of the case. For example, parties are now invited to exchange
documents before examination on discovery to limit the duration of the latter
and prevent irrelevant objections. This seems to be a recognition that evidence
is now more document-based, as opposed to testimony-based, because people
are now exchanging emails instead of meeting in person.
7.97 Organisations continue to rely on their preferred counsel to perform
document review. Unfortunately, the reality for most large firms is to ask a
senior associate, generally with no project management skills, to supervise
junior lawyers to perform the review. Due to the nature of document review,
junior lawyers work on the project without passing on their newly-acquired
skills. This also means there is no learning curve, no expertise is developed, and
there is no increase in efficiency. Accordingly, document review takes more
time and, conversely, is more expensive, but most importantly, it lacks
uniformity.
7.98 For this reason, many in-house and external counsels retain firms
specialising in document review. Aside from the clear monetary benefit, these
alternative firms offer quicker turn-around time and can deal with larger
volumes of data than most firms. This means that major cases can be handled
fairly quickly by a large team of specialised document reviewers. Except for
cases involving an impressive number of documents that need to be reviewed
in a really short period of time, Canada has not yet seen document review
businesses exported abroad. Most Canadian organisations have reservations
about the quality of work performed abroad, but also about the legality of
such an approach in light of privacy, confidentiality and relevancy issues. The
scope of this chapter does not allow a detailed review of such issues. Yet, it is
enlightening to know that many Canadian lawyers assert that the issues
relating to relevancy are an exclusive act reserved to lawyers.
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Production
7.99 Once documents have been reviewed, they are normally prepared for
production. The production mode and form is normally agreed on by the
parties or ordered by the courts in accordance with the local rules of practice
or practice directions, if any, or with the National Generic Protocol1 and the
National Model Practice Direction for the Use of Technology in Civil
Litigation2. The National Model Practice Direction indicates, at paragraph 1.1, that it provides 'guidance to parties in the use of Technology for the
preparation and management of civil litigation in the Court and a Court
approved framework for managing both Hard Copy and electronic Documents in a Technology environment.'
1

2

National Model Practice Direction For the Use of Technology in Civil Litigation, at
http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/JTAC%20National%20Model%20Practic(l).pdf.
National Generic Protocol For Use with the National Model Practice Direction for the Use of
Technology in Civil Litigation, at
http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/JTAC%20National%20Generic%20Proto(l).pdf.

Presentation
7.100 At the time of writing, most of the evidence is presented in paper format
in Canadian courts. There are courts across the country where millions of
dollars have been invested to set up technologies, normally for the purpose of
a particularly important case. However, once the case in question is over, these
courts often cannot be used because of the absence of competent IT support,
and lawyers or judges that have any knowledge of IT. Besides these reasons,
most provincial case management systems, where parties do not know which
judges will hear their case and in which court, prevent the proper planning
required to have an effective electronic trial. Furthermore, the fact that most
jurisdictions do not have electronic filing systems in place thwarts the whole
process. However, this situation should change over the coming years with the
creation of the Canadian Centre for Court Technology1, which has been
established to improve access to justice through the use of technology. As an
alternative, some judges2 and lawyers have taken their own electronic office to
the court, where lawyers bring their computers and perhaps some monitors, a
switch, a projector and a screen to present the evidence. This type of e-court
has been successfully used in some cases3.
1
2

3

See http://www.ccct-cctj.ca.
For example, see B.T. Granger J, 'Taking the next step and why you should', Computer
Educational Skills Training Seminar (11-13 December 2007), National Judicial Institute,
Halifax.
For example, see GasTOPS Ltd v Forsyth, 2009 CanLII 66153 (ON S.C.) where the judge
even delivered his judgement in electronic format only; B. T. Granger J, 'Using litigation
support software in the courtroom - Better lawyer, better judge, better justice - The need for
judicial leadership' (13—15 September 2005), presented at the National Center
for State Courts, Ninth National Court Technology Conference, Seattle, Washington,
available at
http://www.practicepro.ca/practice/PDF/UsingLitigationSupportSoftwareinCourtroom.pdf.
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Technologies and processes
7.101 In this section, consideration is given to the different phases of the
Electronic Discovery Reference Model1 (EDRM) to explain how Canadians
approach them in terms of technologies and processes. The section will
conclude by looking at the new move toward the insourcing of different phases
of the EDRM by organisations and law firms.
1

See http://edrm.net.

Search
7.102 As mentioned above, in terms of locating the potentially relevant
information, Canadian organisations normally do not have an effective
enterprise search engine to seek documents. A small number of organisations,
mainly those facing constant litigation because of their size, have search and
collection capacities. However, this capacity is normally held within the
security department, and often corporate counsel will prefer to rely on third
parties to perform these tasks, in order to reduce the possibility of being
challenged with a conflict of interest if such tasks are performed internally.
However, in most organisations, searches are simply performed by the
custodians themselves after receiving certain guidelines from their in-house or
external counsel. IT staff are often put to the task and asked to run searches
over servers.
Collection
7.103 Most organisations in Canada perform a collection-preservation process, whereby the information that needs to be preserved is collected using
different technologies to ensure that the potentially relevant information is not
altered. Historically, the preferred collection method was for full forensic
mirror-imaging of hard drives and servers. However, the excessive volume of
documents captured, their low relevancy, the delays and costs of processing,
hosting and reviewing, have caused lawyers to move away from this approach
to favour logical collection. In smaller cases or in cases where parties have
agreed accordingly, parties will perform manual collection, either with the help
of their IT personnel or the custodians themselves. This approach could
certainly be efficient and economical. However, it is fraught with risks that
most counsel are still unaware of. For instance, by drag and dropping or
copying and pasting documents to a shared server or a USB key, the custodian
is likely to change metadata, such as the purported 'created date', 'last accessed
date', 'author', etc. That being said, it is now being recognised that such
metadata are not relevant in all cases.
Scanning and coding
7.104 Many lawyers in Canada still think that e-discovery means scanning
paper documents to electronic format to upload them in a litigation support
platform. Besides such an erroneous misunderstanding, the reality is that most
Canadian cases still include large quantities of paper documents, partly
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because of poor information management within the client organisation,
which leads to duplication of material in paper and electronic formats. Under
the circumstance, and unless a coding system correlates paper and electronic
documents1, paper documents need to be scanned and processed through
Optical Character Recognition (OCR), to be reviewed with the electronic
documents. In many cases, lawyers ask their clients to print the relevant
documents and then ask a service bureau to scan and OCR them; moreover,
sometimes lawyers require all documents to be coded even before the first
review. However, lawyers are usually aware that coding, particularly subjective
coding, should be performed after the review stage for the analysis phase,
when documents are often migrated to a litigation support platform.
1

For which, in the US context, see Daniel R. Rizzolo, 'Legal privilege and the high cost of
electronic discovery in the United States: Should we be thinking like lawyers?', Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 6 (2009), pp 139-152.

Processing
7.105 The processing phase still appears as an unknown area of expertise for
most lawyers who do not understand what happens during that part of the
EDRM. This is because they retain third parties to handle the data. After
collecting the data, service providers generally bring the data to their offices to
be 'processed'. In fact, this phase is meant to reduce the volume of documents
that will need to be manually (that is, visually) reviewed by the attorneys. The
processing phase encompasses different steps that might be needed in certain
cases but not in others, depending on the nature of the case or of the data. They
are set out below.

DENISTiNG
7.106 DeNISTing is necessary when a full forensic image, a bit-by-bit copy,
has been taken. It basically identifies standard files that are found on a hard
drive or server and that are normally irrelevant to a case - mainly system and
software files. The list of these files can be found on the National Institute of
Science and Technology's (NIST) website1, hence the name of this phase.
1

See http://www.nist.com.

METADATA EXTRACTION AND INDEXING
7.107 During this phase, metadata are extracted from the documents that
have been collected, mainly to enable them to be sorted, filtered and organised.
It is one of the reasons why most lawyers are so adamant about preserving the
metadata, even if most of them are rarely relevant to the case itself. These 'data
about data' substantially reduce the number of documents to be reviewed
through filtering. For instance, if the facts of a case happened between 2001
and 2004, documents preceding or following that period should not be
relevant. That is, however, subject to how the information is managed within
the organisation. The same type of logic can be used for names, emails, file
extensions, etc. It is generally at this phase that document content is indexed
to enable full text searches.
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SEARCHING
7.108 After assessing the case by reviewing the proceedings and the available
documents, lawyers normally provide a list of key words to the vendor
retained. However, searching is now seen by many as a science that requires a
good knowledge of language, semantics, ontology and how various technologies work. Accordingly, lists are generally incomplete and need to be improved
by experts to ensure that, by running the searches, relevant evidence is not
excluded or irrelevant material is included. More sophisticated types of
searches are emerging frequently: dictionary, thesaurus, concept, context,
patterns, trend, relational searches. Some products are excellent when used by
experts and can substantially reduce production costs and delays.
7.109 Search is also used extensively in the context of sampling exercises
where a party wants to assess the relevance of a certain type of document - for
example, backup tapes or legacy system - without restoring all the data. The
party will choose a subset of documents or media, either randomly or
strategically, case permitting, and will run searches on it to see the degree of
relevancy of the documents. Depending on the results, the party will decide if
it is proportionate to process and review all the media or if the exercise would
be too burdensome for the expected return on investment.
DEDUPING
7.110 One of the recognised realities behind electronic documents is that they
multiply easily and without users' awareness. Accordingly, to prevent lawyers
from having to review the same documents several times, technologies are
being used to identify duplicates, or identical files, and near-duplicates, or
similar documents. For example, a Word® file converted to a PDF would not
be recognised as a duplicate, but depending on the fuzziness used to neardedup, it will be flagged as a near-duplicate. Likewise, near-deduping technology is used to handle email threads to enable the lawyers to review the last
emails and see the difference between versions of the exchange. Deduplication
is achieved by using hash functions. Even if this exercise is carried out to get
rid of certain documents for the purpose of reviewing them, it does not mean
that the duplicates and near-duplicates can simply be destroyed. On the
contrary, they must be retained and be easily producible1. Furthermore, it must
be noted that the strategy and timing for the deduplication effort will vary
substantially from case to case. For organisations that have a good information
management infrastructure and where privileged, confidential and personal
information is segregated at the server level, deduplication technology can be
used to ease and expedite the privilege review by running the hash of the
documents found on dedicated servers and the document set that was
collected.
1

For which, see Anne Kershaw and Joseph Howie, 'Survey of E-Discovery providers pertaining
to deduping strategies', available at
http://www.ediscoveryinstitute.org/pubs/dedupe-report.pdf.
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Review
7.111 As already mentioned, the review tends to be the most time-consuming
and expensive phase of e-discovery because of the volume of documents
involved. This reality is exacerbated by lawyers' reluctance to rely more
heavily on technology to further reduce the volume of documents. Many
contend that the situation can be explained by their inherent conflict of
interest. In Canada, document review exercises are mostly handled in a linear
fashion by looking at documents one after the other. When such an approach
is unrealistic, because of volume, deadlines or cost, more sophisticated
technology is being used to organise, sort and cluster information to increase
reviewing speed and efficiency. These projects are normally handled by firms
that specialise in document review and are proficient in the use of more
advanced software. They normally provide 24-hour review services by contract lawyers with hourly rates lower than what can be expected from most
firms. The review process is often separated into three different phases. During
the first phase, often referred to as 'first pass', relevant documents are quickly
identified. In parallel to this phase, it is normal to apply quality control
measures by sampling, to the documents tagged as relevant or irrelevant. The
second pass is a more thorough review of documents flagged as relevant, and
tends to be completed by more senior lawyers to confirm relevancy, and also
to indicate privilege, confidential or personal information.
Production, disclosure and communication
7.112 The objective of the review phase is to produce or, in Quebec, to
communicate, the relevant documents to the opposing party. Once the
redaction is completed, paralegal or administrative assistants prepare an
affidavit of documents detailing the relevant and privilege documents. In
Quebec, a simple list of the documents that a party intends to use or that has
been explicitly requested by the other party is prepared.
REMOVING IRRELEVANT MATERIALS
7.113 However, after reviewing the documents, it is necessary to remove
irrelevant, personal, confidential and privileged material to prevent the
opposing party from taking cognisance of such information. In Canada,
solicitor-client and litigation privileges are quasi-constitutional rights, entrenched in the Charter of Rights, and hence protected. Nevertheless, the
adoption of technologies has not come with infused science for everyone and,
in many cases, documents are still poorly or improperly edited, leaving the
information accessible to the other party.
Litigation support software
7.114 There are a number of products that provide litigation support
software, although lawyers continue to confuse litigation support and document review. Accordingly, many law firms want to undertake part of the
e-discovery process themselves, rather than relying on third parties. To this
effect, they acquire sophisticated software only to realise that document review
platforms are not litigation support software. Review platforms are used to
review massive volumes of documents to segregate relevant and privileged
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documents from irrelevant material. Most of them offer organisation, search
and tagging capacity. On the other hand, even if litigation support software
can be used to review small volumes of documents, they were designed to
support lawyers' analysis work: organising the evidence, generating affidavits
of documents, preparing examination on discovery and pleadings.
Information management infrastructure
7,115 While Canadian organisations had embraced technologies in the mid908 by massively acquiring computers and servers and implementing different
communication and editing software, they had not adopted the accessories
required to cope with the ever-increasing volume of information. This
section will look at the benefits of information management and the technologies that can be used to improve the control organisations have over their
information.
Handling e-discovery
7.116 In the twenty-first century, organisations must take control over their
information. It has been said that 'more data will be produced in the next five
years than in the entire history of human kind, a digital deluge that marks the
beginning of the Century of Information.'1 The corollary to this striking reality
is that the volume of information with which lawyers and their clients will
contend will increase proportionally, unless identifiable issues are dealt with in
a preventive manner. This section offers an overview of what progressive
Canadian corporations are doing to handle e-discovery.
1

Century-of-Information Research (CIR), 'A strategy for research and innovation in the century
of
information',
Prometheus
27.1
(2009),
pp
27-45,
available
at
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a908705479~db=all~jumptype=rss.

Team
7.117 Whereas litigation used to be dealt with by a small group comprised of
outside and in-house counsel, with the support of their respective internal team
of assistants and paralegal, e-discovery is forcing organisations to set up
multidisciplinary teams complemented by information technology and information security specialists; records managers and archivists; department and
business unit heads; personnel from the human resources and communication
departments, and third parties such as e-discovery consultants and service
bureaus.
7.118 In most cases, such a team is established in order to develop the
document retention policy. However, such committees should be maintained
and confirmed, because the committee will also overview e-discovery and
develop relevant strategy. Its members should keep abreast of new technologies
that are implemented in the organisation and assess their effect; best practices
for information management and e-discovery, and new laws and case law
regarding e-discovery. Committee members also develop guidelines and educate members of staff to help them manage their information or provide
documents in case of litigation. Most importantly, they are the first ones to be
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called upon in such circumstances to lead the exercise and ensure compliance
with the applicable rules, policies and procedures. The team and its members
have both a preventive and curative role. They identify potential issues before
they arise and deal with them when they become inevitable. Each case is
different and it is impossible to foresee all potential issues. However, recurrent
themes exist in the e-discovery market and they are the ones on which
organisations generally focus.
Volume
7.119 The retention of useless information, the duplication of most documents and their atomisation across different media is certainly the single
element that has the biggest and worst effect on the reputation of e-discovery.
However, it is possible to take control and reduce the volume considerably by
developing policies, implementing technology and educating employees to
ensure compliance.
Costs

7.120 Cost is, however, the theme discussed the most in Canada. Similar to
what happens in the US, lawyers who are reluctant to learn about technology
claim that e-discovery is changing litigation because of the escalating costs.
Paradoxically, the largest expenses in the e-discovery process relate to document review, performed by the lawyers. By relying more heavily on technologies, the cost of e-discovery is often shown to be less than the cost of handling
paper documents.
Burden
7.121 The time needed by different employees to deal with their organisations' production obligations is an important burden, because it takes many
people away from their daily job to focus on data identification and collection.
The IT department is also generally involved in the process without having the
time or the expertise needed to identify and collect data. This situation results
in higher risks and sometimes a significant loss of productivity. The only way
to reduce such a burden is to set up a dedicated and knowledgeable team,
implement proper technology, policies and processes, and exercise control over
information.
Timing
7.122 Production deadlines tend to be quite short when considered in the
context of e-discovery. There might also be sanctions for the delayed production of documents, because some statutes provide powers to fine defendants
that do not comply with their discovery obligations. Where a regulatory
agency initiates an investigation, the defendant might be required to pay a
penalty every day for failing to comply with their obligations. This further
militates in favour of being e-discovery ready and is often the most compelling
argument for higher management to invest the money, resources and time
required.
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Data types
7.123 The vast majority of documents dealt with in e-discovery are unstructured data, mainly emails. This type of document is generally spread out
throughout the network and thus is difficult to identify, preserve and collect.
Nevertheless, there are many software products that can help organisations
handle unstructured data. Structured data such as databases are easier to deal
with in terms of identification. However, they present important challenges for
the preservation of the data they contain. They are often updated repeatedly by
overwriting previously existing data. Databases also pose problems with their
review, because they rely on proprietary technologies for which no document
review platform has been developed. Accordingly, the most effective way to
review the content of a database is to generate reports, an approach that might
affect the impression that the reported information has, depending on its
context.
7.124 Another issue relating to data types is format. The speed at which
technology evolves can lead to situations where a document generated with a
particular software ten or even three years earlier might be impossible to read
because the software is no longer available. Under such circumstances, it could
be argued that the documents are not reasonably accessible1. However, this
argument may not succeed if the documents involved were supposed to be
retained for legal reasons or in accordance with the organisation's document
retention policy.
1

Principle 5, The Sedona Canada Principles.

Media
7.125 A similar issue arises from legacy media that might become unreadable
or unusable. For that reason, document retention policies normally contain
provisions pertaining to the recurrent migration of data from old to new
media.
Network
7.126 Large organisations, and sometimes smaller ones, have complex or
disconnected networks which prevent the use of advanced search technology
and mandate a manual approach. Regardless of the size of the organisation,
another issue relating to the existing network is bandwidth availability. This
might have an effect on searching for data, but most importantly on remote
collection. Additional problems might also be generated during the review
phase if the exercise is performed on a remote server or where the client uses
software as a service, otherwise known as SAAS or cloud computing.
Identification
7.127 Identification of potentially relevant data is the first phase of the
e-discovery process following the start of litigation or its likelihood. At this
stage, counsel normally meets with the potential witness to understand the case
and its scope in terms of relevant information. Ideally, this exercise should be
206

Canada 7.130
completed with IT personnel and an e-discovery consultant to ensure proper
planning. Often disregarded, it is the most important phase of the e-discovery
process since any error in planning might result in over-collection and high
costs, or insufficient preservation leading to potential sanctions. Canadian
organisations are currently developing identification protocols and checklists
to help them identify: the relevant period; custodians; document types;
information sources; and keywords. These developments will help to ensure
the organisation is able to approach litigation more coherently in the future. It
also streamlines the process and consequently reduces its inherent costs and
risks. Depending on the organisation or the litigation at bar, identification can
be performed manually (the process by which individual data sources are
searched in order to find the relevant information) or by automated means.
Preservation and collection techniques and methodologies
7.128 Preservation and collection are two independent phases with different
scopes and objectives, but in technological terms they share the same
challenges and are often performed jointly. For this reason, both phases will be
discussed in this section. As in the paper world, where original documents were
often kept in the court for the duration of the trial, many organisations prefer
to retain their electronic documents in the court. However, due to the volatile
nature of electronic documents, it is almost impossible, or highly risky in most
cases, to preserve the documents in the court, unless the organisation uses a
suitable technology to protect documents from being modified or overwritten.
Even if the documents are protected in this way, it remains an uncertain
approach as the support itself could become corrupted, unstable or unreadable. This method can also be explored to comply with the proportionality
principle or for certain documents, such as those with limited relevance. In
most cases, potentially relevant documents are collected in order to be
preserved and eventually processed and reviewed. Such an approach is the
equivalent, in the paper world, of taking copies of the original documents and
setting them aside for future use. Depending on the case at bar, preservationcollection can be performed in different ways discussed below.
Mirror imaging
7.129 For years now, most preservation efforts have been undertaken by
performing a bit-by-bit image of the media on which the relevant documents
are found. This is the safest approach to ensure the preservation of relevant
documents and to maintain their integrity. It also provides an inexpensive way
to collect vast document volumes. On the other hand, such an approach
systematically results in over-preservation with the inherent risks and expenses. It is also the most invasive means of collection, because it collects
everything that is found on the media, including irrelevant information which
might be personal and confidential in nature.
Logical collection
7.130 Logical collection is another forensically sound collection method
focusing on potentially relevant information. It takes more time than full
207

7.130 The practical management of electronic evidence
imaging but provides many benefits, including reduced invasiveness, lower
costs and fewer delays for processing, proportionality, and fewer retention
risks. The only downside is the potential need to go back to previously
collected media to collect new documents that were not known to be relevant
the first time around.
MANUAL
7.131 This type of collection-preservation consists in copying or drag-anddropping documents to another medium. It follows the same rationale as
logical collection but without preserving the full integrity of the document.
Unless specialised software is used, this approach modifies metadata such as
purported 'accessed date', 'modified date' 'created date' or 'author'. This
process is often used for low to medium-risk cases or cases with a limited
number of documents or custodians. However, it could be used in most cases
where the modified metadata are not relevant; that is, in most cases. Even in
cases where particular metadata might be relevant, it is possible to agree with
the opposing party that the approach involved is appropriate. For proportionality reasons, it might even be justified for a court to conclude that manual
collection is the only suitable method. The new rules of procedures currently
in force or being reviewed in most jurisdictions across the country encourage
or mandate collaboration and agreement between counsels and parties
through, for example, meet and confer sessions, as suggested by the Sedona
Canada Principles1.
1

Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic Discovery, Principle 4.

Production
7.132 The production of the trial documents is generally seen as clerical work
and left to administrative assistants to complete. However, lawyers should be
aware of the protocol leading up to the discovery of evidence, and Principle 8
of the Sedona Canada Principles provides that:
'Parties should agree as early as possible in the litigation process on the format in
which electronically stored information will be produced. Parties should also agree
on the format, content and organization of information to be exchanged in any
required list of documents as part of the discovery process.'

The reason behind that statement is that, in many cases, parties have
undertaken the e-discovery process without discussing their expectations with
the other side, only to be surprised a year later with paper document
production. It is important for counsel to agree on the format of documents to
be exchanged, because each format has its benefits and disadvantages,
although it is true to say that most production sets include various formats.
Image
7.133 Historically, images (Tiffs and PDFs) have been the norm in Canada for
production purposes. There is a two-fold explanation to this: practically, they
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almost perfectly mimic paper, and technically, most litigation support software
did not support native files (see 7.135 below). Software has since evolved, and
most support native files. Nevertheless, images are still being used because of
certain benefits they provide, including stability, redaction and page numbering. However, it is necessary for the parties to agree on the type and qualities
of the images to be exchanged and to be aware of the costs and risks involved
when converting native files to images. For instance, depending on the
conversion settings and native file types, hyperlinks, comments and track
changes may not be displayed on the image. Word-processing files may have
auto-dates that will change the original date when converted; moreover,
spreadsheets have hidden cells, rows and columns, as well as formulae that will
not be apparent. Counsel should also agree on Bates numbers, fielded data,
format of the searchable text, load files, redactions and stamps.
OCR
7.134 When most documents that were produced were in paper format, after
being scanned they needed to be processed with OCR software to recognise
characters and words within the generated images. However, now that most
documents are still in native format before being converted, OCR is not needed
unless the document has been flattened to an image state in the conversion
process.

Native
7.135 'Native' format refers to the format in which the document was
originally created. For example, Word® files are produced as .doc or .docx
files, pictures as JPEG or similar formats. Native files are necessary for
spreadsheets or databases in order to facilitate sorting and filtering but also to
be aware of underlying formulae. For some file types, the native format may be
the only way to produce the documents adequately. The main benefits of native
production are that it eliminates the delays and expenses relating to image
conversion, and that files are easily searchable without potential OCR errors.
It is also easy to demonstrate authenticity by using hash algorithms. However,
native files are impossible to alter to remove confidential or personal information, are exposed to a high risk of alteration and may require native
applications to be viewed.
Confidential and privileged information
7.136 When preparing for litigation, a range of problems occur with information that is confidential, privileged or personal - none of which should be
revealed to the other side. Principle 9 of the Sedona Canada Principles states:
'During the discovery process parties should agree to or, if necessary, seek judicial
direction on measures to protect privileges, privacy, trade secrets and other
confidential information relating to the production of electronic documents and
data.'

Electronic documents must be handled and secured in a different fashion as
compared to paper in the past. For example, boxes filled with lists of clients
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with credit card numbers could have been produced on paper and be secured
in a vault or in a locked office at a law firm. However, if the same lists are
found on an MS Excel® spreadsheet, they could easily be attached to an email
or uploaded to a USB key. They could also be accessed by many people on a
centralised DMS or illegally accessed and downloaded by anyone connecting
to the unsecured Wi-Fi cloud of a law firm.
7.137 As the case of Air Canada v Westjet Airlines Ltd1 demonstrated,
privilege review is an important challenge. While technology might be very
helpful, courts are reluctant to rely on mechanical review, and still require
parties to review their documents manually. The volume of documents dealt
with in large cases often means that highly sensitive data will be produced to
the opposing party. Accordingly, lawyers should involve their clients in the last
phases of the analysis to ensure that they do not produce secret material to the
other side.
1

2006 CanLII 14966 (ON S.C.).

7.138 Privacy is heavily legislated in Canada. The fundamental concepts
underlying Canadian personal information protection legislation are: the
requirement of informed consent to the collection, use and disclosure of
personal information; the need to develop policies and procedures to address
an organisation's privacy practices, including facilitating individuals' access to,
and correction of, their personal information; and the need to develop
appropriate safeguards to preserve the security and integrity of personal
information within an organisation's control. Most Canadian personal information protection statutes contain provisions that allow the production of
documents containing non-party personal information to an opponent in the
context of litigation without individual consent and without providing prior or
subsequent notice of disclosure. However, courts prefer to prevent unnecessary
disclosure of personal information and, accordingly, privacy considerations
are often part of the proportionality analysis that judges take into consideration in rendering decisions related to discovery. Therefore, parties to litigation
should edit, to the largest extent possible, private information that is not
relevant to the case.
Future
7.139 E-discovery is a fairly new concept in Canada and it has only started to
form a role in larger cases. However, with the new rules of procedure including
e-discovery provisions coming into force over the next year in most jurisdictions, it is reasonable to foresee an important increase in the number of cases
relating to e-discovery.
ENGLAND 8c WALES
7.140 The main purpose of this section of the book is to give some practical
guidance to lawyers responsible for giving disclosure in civil proceedings in
England and Wales, to those who work with and for them in this endeavour,
and to judges who manage cases. The relevant provisions of the Civil
Procedure Rules (CPR) and the common law principles applicable to disclo210
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INTRODUCTION: THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE
9.01 This chapter will briefly survey the state of the law regarding the
gathering, discovery and admissibility of electronic evidence in Canada. As a
general comment, Canada is a comparatively wealthy and technologicallydeveloped Western country, and in terms of the creation and use of electronic
data it is probably abreast of most other OECD member states. Perhaps
because of its relatively small population (approximately 33.5m), the amount
of litigation is much smaller compared to other countries, particularly the
United States. As a result, while both the legislatures and the common law are
grappling with the new legal frontiers created by the need to deal with
electronic evidence, the law is more well-developed in some areas than in
others.
9.02 An important feature that should be noted for the foreign reader is
Canada's jurisdictional structure, which is much more segmented than some1.
Canada is a federal state, and the Constitution divides jurisdiction over
legislative matters between the 'federal' or central government and the
governments of the ten provinces and three territories. There is therefore a
regulatory jurisdiction inherent in each level of government. The most
important distinction for present purposes is that the federal government has
jurisdiction over the criminal law, while jurisdiction over civil and property
matters rests with the provinces and territories. Canada is a constitutional
monarchy and member of the Commonwealth; the monarch of England is
formally the head of state for Canada, and both the federal and provincial
governments are each often referred to as the 'Crown'.
1

An authoritative general resource on Canadian constitutional law is Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf edn (1992), Carswell.

9.03 Each province has a court structure that can be roughly broken into
inferior, superior and appellate courts. All three levels of court can administer
both federal and provincial or territorial law. Operating parallel to the
provincial superior courts is the Federal Court of Canada, which has concurrent jurisdiction with the provincial superior courts in civil cases where the
Federal Crown is a litigant, and also has jurisdiction over cases in some
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specialised areas within federal legislative jurisdiction (tax, admiralty, immigration, intellectual property)1. Appeals from both the provincial appellate
courts and the Federal Court of Appeal are heard by the Supreme Court of
Canada, which is the highest appellate court.
1

There are also federally, and provincially-constituted administrative tribunals, appeals from
which generally go to the Federal Court of Canada or the provincial appellate courts,
respectively.

9.04 As in most common law jurisdictions1, Canadian evidence law2 emerges
primarily from the common law. The common law of evidence does not vary
between jurisdictions, so each court will apply essentially the same evidence
law regardless of whether it is hearing a case based in federal or provincial
competence. However, the common law is modified and supplemented by
evidence statutes in each jurisdiction, each of which modifies the law of
evidence within that legislative realm. Criminal and federal regulatory matters
come under the Canada Evidence Act3, while each of the provinces and
territories has its own evidence statute4.
1

2

3
4

The province of Quebec is primarily a 'civil law' (in the European sense) jurisdiction, and areas
of provincial legislative competence come under this civil law regime. Book VII of the
Civil Code of Quebec functions as that province's equivalent to the other provincial evidence
statutes. Most matters peculiar to Quebec law will not be given specific attention in this
chapter.
The standard reference works on Canadian evidence law are David M. Paciocco and
Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (5th edn, 2008), Irwin Law; and Alan W. Bryant, Sidney
N. Lederman and Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada (3rd edn, 2009),
Butterworths. On this specific topic, see Alan Gahtan, Electronic Evidence (1999), Carswell.
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
For instance, Nova Scotia Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154; Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. E.23.

9.05 The interrelation of law and jurisdiction can be confusing. For clarity, the
following may be helpful: in the province of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court
of Nova Scotia is the province's superior court. On Monday it might hear a
criminal murder trial, in which it would apply the criminal law (federal, under
the Criminal Code of Canada)1, and in which it would adhere to the common
law of evidence as modified by the Canada Evidence Act. On Tuesday, it might
hear a civil negligence case (provincial, because a civil matter), in which it
would adhere to the common law of evidence as modified by the Nova Scotia
Evidence Act2.
1
2

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Nova Scotia Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154.

9.06 Canadian litigation is adversarial in nature, and maintains the traditional
distinction between trier of law and trier of fact. Juries are available to
function as trier of fact in both criminal and civil cases, though they are more
common in the former than in the latter (and not terribly common in either).
Admissibility and weight
9.07 The basic concepts which underpin Canadian evidence law will be
familiar to most readers, particularly those in common law jurisdictions. At
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trial, the judge (as trier of law) decides whether each item of evidence offered
by any party is admissible, so that it can it be placed before the trier of fact for
consideration in its decisions as to what the facts are. For evidence to be
admissible, it must be relevant to a fact that is material. This is to say, the item
of evidence must have some tendency to make the existence of a fact more or
less probable; and that fact must be one that is at issue in the case1. Once an
item of evidence has been ruled admissible, it becomes part of the body of
evidence that the trier of fact, at the end of the trial, must 'weigh' in its exercise
of fact-finding. Weighing involves the trier of fact scrutinising the evidence,
deciding which parts are accepted and which rejected, in order to arrive at its
ultimate decision as to what the facts of the case were, and beyond that
whether one party or the other has proven its case in accordance with the
applicable burden and standard of proof.
1

For an excellent synopsis of these basic concepts, see David Paciocco,' "Truth and proof": The
basics of the law of evidence in a "guilt-based" system' (2000) 6 Can. Crim. L.Rev. 71.

9.08 Two points should be added. First, and generally speaking, in Canadian
evidence law admissibility is a low threshold, and defects in the quality or
reliability of the evidence will usually go to weight. This is somewhat less so in
criminal cases, where the rules of evidence are applied more strictly due to the
imperative that the accused receive a fair trial. Second, admissibility and
weight formally are kept separate. The trier of law, in making decisions on
admissibility, cannot impinge on the fact-finding role of the trier of fact, and
accordingly the trier of law does not weigh the evidence. To the extent that
certain kinds of evidence exceptionally require some weighing by the trial
judge in order to determine admissibility1, such weighing is confined simply to
determining whether the evidence in question could be the basis for a
reasonable finding of fact - the actual weighing is left to the trier of fact.
1

For example, in a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal by the defence in a criminal case,
the court is expected to engage in a 'limited weighing' of the evidence adduced by the Crown,
in order to ascertain whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict on the basis
of that evidence (see R. v Arcuri, [2001] 2 SCR 828). With similar fact evidence, the potential
prejudice is so high that the judge is expected to conduct a detailed evaluation of the probative
value of the evidence, in effect a kind of limited weighing (see R. v Handy, [2002] 2 SCR 908).
Similarly, with hearsay evidence, the key admissibility question is the reliability of the
proffered out-of-court statement (see R. v Khelawon, [2006] 2 SCR 787).

Types of evidence
9.09 In litigation, evidence is typically adduced in the form of either oral
testimony given by witnesses, or real evidence. The label 'real evidence' covers
objects which are immediately relevant to the case (for instance, a cellular
telephone, a notebook computer), but also more specialised forms of real
evidence such as documents (both hardcopy and electronic), photographs and
video recordings.
9.10 Evidence is also classified as being either direct or circumstantial, in
terms of the reasoning it is intended to sustain. The paradigmatic direct
evidence is witness testimony as to a particular fact - the relationship between
the evidence and the fact it is offered to prove is linear, and the trier of fact
either accepts or rejects the witness's testimony in its fact-finding. Circumstan-
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tial evidence, by contrast, requires the trier of fact both to accept the proffered
evidence as being true or authentic, and then to draw an inference that the
proffered evidence does prove the fact it is offered to prove. There is no real
hierarchy between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of their
probative value1.
1

Though in criminal cases where the Crown's case is entirely circumstantial, it must be
conveyed to the jury 'that in order to convict, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the
accused is guilty' (R. v Griffin, 2009 SCC 28 at [33]).

Primary and secondary evidence (relevance)
9.11 Canadian evidence law also maintains the distinction between primary
and secondary relevance, or more specifically the distinction between evidence
that is relevant to a primarily material fact or a secondarily material fact.
Evidence 'is primarily material when it is about a question of fact that is put
into issue by a rule of law that has application in the case, and . . . is
secondarily material when it is about the value or credibility of other evidence
that has been called in the case.'1 As an example, an email from one party to
another offering a sale of goods will be primarily relevant, as it goes to the
material issue of whether there was a contract. The testimony of the
company's records-keeper regarding the technical specifications of their email
storage system, by contrast, would be secondarily relevant, as it goes to the
integrity of the email and whether it is reliable enough to be admissible.
1

Paciocco, 'Truth and proof, p 97.

The rules of evidence
9.12 Beyond the basic relevance threshold, Canadian evidence law contains
all of the traditional canons of exclusion, such as those regarding character,
opinion, hearsay and so on. Over the last 30 years or so, the Supreme Court
of Canada has incorporated a very pro-admissibility or 'inclusionary' tone to
the law of evidence, by which all relevant and material evidence should
presumptively be admitted unless legal or policy grounds clearly point to its
exclusion1. The court has buttressed this approach with an explicit effort to
replace formalism and categorisation in evidence law with principled flexibility
and discretion on the part of the trial judge. This 'principled approach' is
encapsulated by the phrase 'evidence may be excluded where its probative
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect', and of late the court has sought
to re-cast much of traditional evidence law as being applications of this
principle2.
1

2

R. v Corbett, [1988] 1 SCR 670 at 691. See also R. v Seaboyer, (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321
at 399.
See Bryant, Lederman and Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, §1.2-1.30.

9.13 Two other substantive evidence rules important to this chapter should be
mentioned:
(a)
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Expert opinion: there is a distinct admissibility regime for the use of
expert opinion testimony at trial. To be admissible, the expert opinion
must be: relevant (both logically relevant and reliable enough to justify
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(b)

1
2

its admission); necessary (meaning that it must provide information or
inferences which the trier of fact could not reach on its own without the
assistance of the expert); given by a properly qualified expert; and not
excluded by another rule of evidence1.
Privilege: various rules of privilege attach to evidence in certain
circumstances and exempt them from disclosure in either pre-trial
proceedings or at trial. Most important for litigation purposes are
solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege2. Solicitor-client privilege protects as confidential all communications between a lawyer and
any person regarding the provision of legal advice by the lawyer to that
person. Litigation privilege protects all communications (including
documents) generated by a party and its solicitor which are made in
contemplation of litigation, including for example communications
with experts.
R. v Mohan, (1994), 29 C.R. (4th) 243 (S.C.C.).
Paciocco and Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, pp 222-245. Also see Blank v Canada (Minister
of justice), 2006 SCC 39; General Accident Assurance Company v Chrusz, (1999) 45 O.K.
(3d) 321, (1999) 180 D.L.R. (4th) 241 (Ont. C.A.).

9.14 Finally, as noted above, the common law of evidence is replaced or
modified by the evidence statutes that govern trial proceedings. Similar
modification can be done by the procedural rules that govern proceedings in
each jurisdiction, which might abridge privilege, compel disclosure, and so on.
These rules, where relevant, will be covered under the sections entitled 'Civil
proceedings' and 'Criminal proceedings' below.
Electronic documents
9.15 This sub-section will survey some current developments regarding the
admissibility of electronic evidence in Canada. Particular focus will be placed
on relatively recent statutory amendments which have entrenched rules for use
by courts in making admissibility decisions. Evidentiary and procedural points
which are very specific to either civil or criminal litigation will be dealt with in
the relevant sections below.
9.16 To understand the Canadian approach to electronic evidence, it is
important to realise that although policy-makers and law-makers recognise
that this kind of evidence is in some sense 'new' in form and nature, they also
realise that it can in substance be treated as documentary evidence - a kind of
evidence with which the courts are well-acquainted. While this is not
universally true, it is applicable to most kinds of electronic data that will be
submitted by the parties in litigation; 'pure' electronic data will not usually be
sought to be admitted, but is more likely to underpin an expert's report.
Otherwise, most electronic evidence is most usefully assimilated to traditional
documentary evidence for the purposes of admissibility in court, and this tends
to be what Canadian courts have done1. Naturally, however, this needs to be
executed with careful attention to the unique issues involved.
1

For a detailed (and critical) examination, see Ken Chasse, 'Electronic records as documentary
evidence', Canadian Journal of Law & Technology 1.6 (2007), p 141; and Gahtan, Electronic
Evidence, Ch 9.

9.17 The starting point in this area is the work done on the issue by the
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Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC), which adopted a Uniform
Electronic Evidence Act in 1998 (Uniform Act)1. In 1997, the ULCC's working
group on electronic evidence noted2 that evidence law was in need of reform
vis-a-vis electronic documents, due in no small part to the tendency of courts
to blur the lines between three aspects of the admissibility of documents:
(a)

The hearsay rule: documents adduced for the truth of their contents will
be classified as hearsay.
Authentication: to admit a document there must be evidence adduced
that the document is what it is purported to be.
The best evidence rule: the preference at common law was for a party
relying on a document to provide the original of that document, or to
satisfy the court that it would be reasonable to accept a copy.

(b)
(c)

1
2

Available (with detailed commentary) online at: http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfmPsecsl8cs
ub=lu2.
Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Electronic Evidence Act: Consultation Paper
(March 1997), available online at:
http://www.ulcc. ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?sec=19978csub=1997hka.

9.18 Each of these evidentiary rules raises unique issues where electronic
documents are concerned, and the Uniform Act was formulated in an attempt
to encourage coherent law reform in this regard. The Uniform Act has been
adopted, either completely or in modified form, in nine Canadian jurisdictions1. Accordingly, it is worth exploring in some detail, using the relevant
Canada Evidence Act provision as the focus2 for discussion3.
1

2

3

Including the Canada Evidence Act (ss 31.1-31.8), the Nova Scotia Evidence Act (ss 21A-H),
and the Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23 (s 34.1). See chart online at: http://www.
ulcc.ca/en/cls/index.cfm?sec=4&sub=4b, under 'Electronic Evidence Amendments'. Only
Newfoundland, British Columbia, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories have yet to adopt
some form of electronic evidence legislation (Chasse, 'Electronic records as documentary
evidence', p 142).
There are very few reported decisions on the application of these legislative provisions, and
those which do exist are all on the CEA provisions. We think this is due not to under-use of
the provisions, but rather because trial judges are simply applying them as a matter of course,
and seriously-fought motions that would result in a reported decision are few and far between.
The lack of decisions in civil cases (which, as will be recalled, are governed by the provincial
evidence legislation) may also be contributed to by the fact that the civil procedure rules often
contain rules requiring parties to object to the 'integrity' of a document either during the
discovery phase or not at all, which settles in advance many objections that might otherwise
be made at trial.
This section relies on the excellent scholarship on this point by John D. Gregory, 'Canadian
electronic commerce legislation' (2002) 17 BFLR 277, particularly pp 327-338; and Chasse,
'Electronic records as documentary evidence'; also John D. Gregory, 'The law goes electronic'
in T. Archibald and R. Echlin (eds), Annual Review of Civil Litigation 2009 (2009), Toronto:
Carswell, pp 127-192.

9.19 While 'electronic documents' are sometimes electronic versions of paper
documents (for instance, a scan of an existing paper document that is saved on
a computer hard drive), much of the evidence required in litigation will be
generated on a computer and will only see the light of day as a print-out of that
data. The definition of 'electronic document' in the Uniform Act is broad
enough to prevent much court time being wasted on the topic, as it includes
both data 'recorded or stored' on a computer system as well as 'a display,
print-out or other output of that data.'1
1

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.8.
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9.20 In terms of authentication of electronic documents, the Uniform Act
codifies the common law rule which places the burden on the party adducing
the document to provide 'evidence capable of supporting a finding that the
electronic document is that which it is purported to be.'1 Given the use of the
words 'capable of supporting a finding', this is best read as a strictly evidential
burden; whether the document actually is what it purports to be will ultimately
be decided by the trier of fact2.
1
2

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.1
Gregory, 'Canadian electronic commerce legislation', p 331.

Best evidence rule
9.21 The other functional hurdle to the admissibility of a document is the best
evidence rule. Traditionally, this rule was designed to compel a party to
demonstrate the integrity of a document by either providing the original or by
demonstrating that the copy adduced was sufficiently trustworthy for use by
the court. The rule maps poorly on to electronic documents, which often
cannot be traced down to an 'original', particularly in a networked environment. In addition, the distinction between 'original' and 'copy' is not of much
use, because there is usually in practice no discernible difference between the
original and the copy. Thus, the original is not likely to be more clearly reliable
than a copy.
9.22 The Uniform Act provisions provide the courts with an alternative means
of assessing the integrity of electronic documents. They permit the adducing
party to satisfy the best evidence rule for an electronic document by providing
evidence as to 'the integrity of the electronic documents system by or in which
the electronic document was recorded or stored.'1 Several presumptions are set
up to allow efficient proof of integrity, which can be established through: proof
that the storage medium was operating properly2; proof that the document was
recorded or stored, or recorded and stored by an adverse party3; or proof that
the document was recorded or stored in the ordinary course of business by a
party outside the litigation4. This integrity can be proven by way of affidavit5,
though depending on the nature of the technology, expert evidence may be
required6.
1

2
3
4
5

6

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.2(l)(a). Note also the special provision regarding print-outs of
documents, which are deemed to satisfy the best evidence rule 'if the print-out has been
manifestly or consistently acted on, relied on or used as a record' (Canada Evidence Act,
31.2(2)). For a case where neither was satisfied, see R. v Bellingham, 2002 ABPC 41.
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.3(a).
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.3(b).
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.3(c).
Canada Evidence Act, s 31.6(1). See R. v Morgan, [2002] N.J. No. 15 (NLPC); R. v Adams,
2009 NSPC 15.
For example, see R. v Gratton, 2003 ABQB 728.

9.23 The provisions also allow for evidence to be provided of current
standards, procedures and practices with regard to the integrity of the
recording or storing system1. This evidence can go to the integrity of the
electronic document system, but is also directed at 'determining under any
rule of law whether an electronic document is admissible,' and thus could also
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be used as a source of evidence of the 'reliability' of a document for hearsay
purposes2. The provision seems to allow parties to test the evidence against
current industry standards such as the Standards on Electronic Records as
Documentary Evidence generated by the Canadian General Standards Board3,
or analogous standards from the International Standards Organization, for
example. Such standards are not binding on the court, but will no doubt be
persuasive.
1
2

3

Canada Evidence Act, s 31.5.
In Canadian evidence law, the key to the admissibility of hearsay is whether the evidence is
'necessary' and 'reliable'. See generally, Paciocco and Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, pp
114-130.
CAN/CGSB 72.34-2005 (1 December 2005), available (by purchase) at:
http://www.techstreet.com/cgi-bin/detail?product_id=1252845.

9.24 It is worth emphasising that the Uniform Act scheme is not a complete
package for the admissibility of electronic documents. Rather, it confirms the
application of the common law of authentication to electronic documents, and
provides a means by which parties may satisfy the best evidence rule1. The
documents will still have to satisfy any other applicable rules of evidence in
order to be admitted, such as exceptions to the hearsay rule2.
1

2

It has been opined that, due to the onslaught of electronic copying mechanisms in the twentieth
century, the best evidence rule was fading into obscurity; for which, see Bryant, Lederman and
Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, §18.24. Recognition that electronic document
generation and storage raises its own issues has motivated, correctly in our view, this apparent
revival of the rule.
For instance, see R. v Jiao, 2005 BCPC 12.

Web-based evidence
9.25 The issue of admissibility of web-based evidence is a unique one which
had not attracted a great deal of judicial attention in Canada until very
recently. In ITV Television Inc. v WIC Television Ltd1, a trademark dispute,
the plaintiff ITV sought leave to use the Internet in court in order to
demonstrate certain website mechanisms, such as hyperlinking and interactive
streaming, and also to prove what the content of various websites had been at
specific times in the past. The court, while accepting that any use of the
Internet for truth of contents of the web pages would be hearsay, found that
the 'Way Back Machine' at www.archive.org was a reliable means by which
the previous content of websites could be proven2.
1
2

2003 FC 1056, (2003), 29 C.P.R. (4th) 182, (2003) F.T.R. 203.
2003 FC 1056, (2003), 29 C.P.R. (4 3 ) 182, (2003) F.T.R. 203 at [13]-[15]. The Federal Court
of Appeal affirmed the decision (2005 FCA 96), but expressly declined to rule on this issue;
Pelletier J.A. commented: 'the record is not sufficiently developed to provide an adequate
factual underpinning for an informed consideration of the legal issues raised by the use of the
internet as a source of documentary evidence' (at [30]).

9.26 The court also opined in obiter dicta that 'official' websites, such as those
of governments and well-known organisations, could 'provide reliable evidence that would be admissible as evidence.'1 An 'unofficial' website, by
contrast, would have to be assessed with regard to its sources, independent
corroboration, consideration as to whether it might have been modified from
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what was originally available, and assessment of the objectivity of the person
placing the information online. When these factors cannot be ascertained, little
or no weight should be given to the information obtained from an unofficial
website2.
1

2

2003 FC 1056, (2003), 29 C.P.R. (42) 182, (2003) F.T.R. 203 at [17]. In a subsequent case this
passage was cited in support of what appeared to be a presumption of reliability for 'an
electronic directory of articles published in dailies and magazines known in Canada'
(Moulinsart S.A. v 9200-2880 Quebec Inc. (2008), 74 CPR (4th) 349, Trademarks Opposition
Board).
2003 FC 1056, (2003), 29 C.P.R. (4th) 182, (2003) F.T.R. 203 at [18].

9.27 In principle, use of the web itself as a means of proving web content at
a given point in time should be uncontroversial, so long as the means by which
the proof is given is sufficiently reliable. This may create problems at the
disclosure stage, but the problems are mostly technological rather than legal,
and not insurmountable if the parties are able to devote sufficient resources to
solving them.
9.28 As to the hearsay content of websites, while it is possible to be
sympathetic to the desire to have 'official' websites considered to be reliable
enough to escape the full rigour of the hearsay rule, there would need to be set
criteria as to how such reliability should be established - a task perhaps best
accomplished by amendment of the relevant evidence statutes. Otherwise, the
hearsay rule can be effectively utilised to exclude website content of dubious
reliability when it is introduced1.
1

See Crookes v De Simone, 2007 BCCA 515, where documents posted on a website, which
purported to be minutes of a meeting, were ruled to be inadmissible because they were hearsay
and there was no evidence as to who had posted the documents.

9.29 This is not to say that website content is not often admitted and
considered as evidence in litigation, only that admissibility is seemingly not
often contested1. To the extent that the evidence is seriously considered, it is
around the question of what it proves or what inferences should be drawn
from it. As a prime example, there has recently been an increase in the use, as
evidence, of content contained in social networking sites such as Facebook2.
Canadian courts have shown increasing comfort with using both photographs
and posted text as a means of proving or disproving relevant facts3, often with
little or no attention to their electronic nature - though the latter observation
supports the point made above, that lawyers and courts are mostly assimilating
electronic evidence to documentary evidence, with which they are more
conversant.
1

2

3

In one decision, a trial court apparently admitted a Wikipedia® entry as evidence on a
contested fact, though it was only one part of the evidence on point and the court did not
indicate what weight was being placed on it (Build-A-Vest Structures Inc. v Red Deer (City),
2006 ABQB 869). An interesting decision in which a court heard expert evidence on the weight
that should be given to web-based documents was Jalil v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 246.
For an overview, see P. Pengelley, 'Fessing up to Facebook: Recent trends in the use of social
network websites for civil litigation', Canadian Journal of Law & Technology 7 (2009)
(forthcoming).
For instance, see Hollingsworth v Ottawa Police Services Board, [2007] O.J. No. 5134 (Ont.
S.C.J.); Pawlus c. Hum, [2008] J.Q. No. 12565 (J.C.Q.); Goodridge (Litigation Guardian of)
v King, [2007] O.J. No. 4611 (Ont. S.C.J.); (C.M.R.) v O.D.R., 2008 NBQB 253; Kourtesis
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vjoris, [2007] O.J No. 5539 (Ont. S.C.J.), all cited in Pengelley, 'Fessing up to Facebook', nn
24-26.

Electronic signatures
Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (UECA)
9.30 In 1999, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada adopted the Uniform
Electronic Commerce Act (UECA), as a template or model for electronic
contracts and other issues arising in the emerging field of electronic commerce.
While merely introduced as a suggestive model, this legislation has in fact been
adopted in either identical or very similar terms in each provincial jurisdiction
across Canada1. For this reason, when examining the issue of electronic
signatures and web-based contracts, the UECA is an excellent place to start.
1

In Canada, authority over property and civil rights is given to the provinces by virtue of
s 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The following is a list of the electronic commerce acts
adopted by each province or territory: Electronic Transactions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-5.5
[Alberta]; Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, c. 10 [British Columbia]; The Electronic Commerce and Information Act, S.M. 2000, c. 32 [Manitoba]; Electronic Transactions
Act, S.N.B. 2001, c. E-5.5 [New Brunswick]; Electronic Commerce Act, SNL2001, c. E-5.2
[Newfoundland 8c Labrador]; Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 26 [Nova Scotia];
Electronic Commerce Act, S.O. 2000, c. 17 [Ontario]; Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.P.E.I.
1988 c. E-4.1 [Prince Edward Island]; Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.Y. 2000, c. 66 [Yukon].

9.31 The basic concept underpinning the UECA is that of 'functional equivalency'. Under this concept, any information conveyed via electronic means
(such as through email correspondence or over the Internet) is as legally
binding and enforceable as if it had been conveyed via traditional means (eg in
writing). This arises from s 5 of the UECA which states that 'information shall
not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely by reason that it is in
electronic form'. As mentioned earlier, each provincial act modeled on the
UECA contains a similar provision. Functional equivalency, then, is of central
importance for electronic trade and commerce in that it applies to the very
basic components of contracts (such as offer and acceptance); this section has
been interpreted to mean that any contract entered into via electronic means is
functionally equivalent in law to one entered into via traditional means1.
1

See on this and generally, Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (2nd edn, 2007),
Tottel, Ch 5.

Electronic signatures
9.32 With specific regard to electronic signatures, it is perhaps helpful to
examine some of the provisions of Nova Scotia's Electronic Commerce Act to
get a sense of what provincial legislation says on this specific issue. First, s 2(b)
of the Act defines 'electronic signature' as 'information in electronic form that
a person has created or adopted in order to sign a document and that is in,
attached to or associate with the document'1. Section 11 goes on to state that
electronic signatures are equivalent to conventional signatures. Finally, s 21
expressly authorises the formation of electronic contracts and allows the
communication of both offer and acceptance by electronic means (eg clicking
an icon on a computer screen); according to this section, electronic contracts
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are legally binding and enforceable. While there have not been many cases
where courts have specifically dealt with this issue2, it would appear as though
judges are willing to accept the functional equivalency rule above and assume
that an electronic contract is equally as valid as a written one unless proven
otherwise.
1

2

A review of this provision in the other provincial Acts reveals language that is virtually
identical to the definition contained in Nova Scotia's Act.
Though see Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, Ch 5.

Federal legislation
9.33 There are also provisions in (and under) the federal Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act1 dealing with electronic signatures.
'Electronic signature' is defined in s 31(1) as 'a signature that consists of one
or more letters, characters, numbers or other symbols in digital form incorporated in, attached to or associated with an electronic document.' This part
of the legislation deals with satisfying requirements under other legislation for
documents to be in writing, affixed with a signature, sworn, or otherwise
authentic, and allows for these requirements to be deemed complied with if the
document has a 'secure electronic signature.' In 2005, the government brought
in regulations pursuant to both PIPEDA and the CEA to define secure
electronic signatures. The Secure Electronic Signature Regulations2 provide for
a series of steps to be taken in order to generate a secure electronic signature3,
and enact a presumption that where those steps have been followed, the data
have been signed by the person identified in the digital signature certificate.
1
2

3

S.C. 2000, c. 5 (PIPEDA).
SOR/2005-30; Barbara Mclsaac QC and Howard R Fohr, 'Legal update, Canada: PIPEDA's Secure Electronic Signature Regulations have been published', Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review 1 (2005), pp 71-72.
Sections 2(a)-(e).

Computer-generated animations and simulations
9.34 An issue emerging in Canadian case law is the admissibility of computergenerated images, usually digital animation, as a means of helping to explain
or contextualise expert or lay witness testimony - in short, as demonstrative
evidence. Canadian courts have been dealing with more general issues
surrounding the power and potential prejudice of demonstrative evidence for
some time, and have paid attention to the distorting effect such evidence can
have on the trier of fact1. However, there have to date been relatively few cases
dealing directly with the admissibility of digitally-generated evidence2.
1
2

See R. v MacDonald, (2000), 35 C.R. (5th) 130 (Ont.C.A.); R. v Hummel, 2001 YKSC 508.
See McCutcheon v Chrysler Canada Ltd (1998), [1998] OJ. No. 5818 (Gen. Div.); Sovani v
Jin, 2005 BCSC 1852; R. v Scotland, [2007] O.J. No. 5304 (Ont. S.C.J.).

9.35 Those cases which have arisen (generally in jury trials) have tended to
apply the same test generally used for disputed demonstrative evidence: does it
pass a cost-benefit analysis, in terms of its probative value being outweighed by
its prejudicial effect? To wit, will it help the jury to understand the evidence
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without creating undue sympathy towards the party proffering the evidence,
and/or otherwise distorting the fact-finding process? In making this determination, trial judges have focused on how closely the digital images match the
subject matter they are intended to represent and whether they are overly
one-sided on hotly contested factual issues1. Demonstrative evidence that uses
a computer also tends to require expert testimony, and thus the expert opinion
rules will usually need to be applied. We are not convinced that this test needs
any further development, since it is consistent with the Supreme Court of
Canada's policy of encouraging trial judge discretion in evidentiary matters.
None the less, the issue remains open and is likely to see more consideration
in the near future.
1

For a solid (albeit American) source, see Betsy S. Fiedler, 'Are your eyes deceiving you? The
evidentiary crisis regarding the admissibility of computer generated evidence', New York Law
School Law Review 48.1 and 48.2 (2003-2004), p 295.

Video-tape and security camera evidence
9.36 It has been unambiguously clear in Canada since the Supreme Court's decision in Nikolovski1 that a trier of fact, whether jury or judge sitting alone, is
entitled to rely exclusively on the viewing of security camera evidence in
order to establish the identity of an accused. In that case, the accused was
charged with robbing a convenience store and the clerk, the only eye witness,
was not able to identify the accused with any level of certainty, either in court
or beforehand. However, the incident had been recorded by a security camera,
and the footage was described by the court as 'of excellent quality and great
clarity'. Indeed, the majority noted that '[a]t one point, it is almost as though
there was a close-up of the accused taken specifically for identification
purposes'. In those circumstances, they held, it was open to the trial judge to
conclude that the accused was the person recorded on the tape, without the
need for any corroborative evidence.
1

R. v Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197.

9.37 There are of course various considerations to be taken into account. It
must be established that the tape has not been altered or changed in any way,
and the quality of the tape affects the amount of weight that can be given to
the evidence. The length of time in which the accused appears on the tape
might also be a factor in some cases. Triers of fact should be particularly
cautious about convicting if the only evidence of identification comes from a
videotape, and should bear in mind that they must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, if all these factors are taken into account
properly, then it is permissible for identity to be established based solely on
security camera footage.
9.38 This rule applies in particular in the context of cameras set up to detect
vehicles which are either speeding or failing to observe traffic signals. Note,
however, in that context that some provinces have created statutory schemes in
which license plate numbers are proven by way of a certificate provided by an
officer responsible for the scheme, certifying that he or she has examined the
photograph and determined the license number. In such cases, courts have held
that it is irrelevant if the trier of fact is not personally able to read the license
276

Introduction: The Canadian legal landscape 9.41
number from the photograph. Rather, in such cases the only approach open to
the accused to challenge the evidence is to call the officer who issued the
certificate for cross-examination1.
1

See for example R. v Guinn, [1997] B.C.J. No. 3046; or R. v Eged, 2009 BCPC 180.

Freedom of information and privacy
9.39 Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection statutes exist in Canada
at the federal level and in each province and territory1. For the most part they
are intended to prescribe privacy protection standards for the commercial
sector, requiring businesses not to collect more private information than
necessary, not to disclose it, and most particularly to disclose their privacy
policies to customers. However, there has been an odd and unexpected
interaction between privacy protection statutes and criminal investigative
techniques, which ironically has tended to reduce privacy protection through
the use of privacy protection legislation. It has arisen in the context of police
seeking to determine IP addresses, typically in the context of investigating
possession of child pornography charges.
1

Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) (S.C. 2000, c.5);
Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c. P-6.5; Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165; Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C.
2003, c. 63; The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.M. 1997, c. 50;
Protection of Personal Information Act, S.N.B. 1998, c. P-19.1; Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, SNL 2002, c. A-l.l; Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5; Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act,
S.N.S. 2006, c. 3; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31;
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56;
Personal Health Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c. 3; Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-15.01; An Act Respecting Access to Documents
held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, R.S.Q. c. A-2.1; The
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01; The Health
Information Protection Act, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021; The Local Authority Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. L-27.1; Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20; Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1.

9.40 This is discussed under Canadian criminal law, and in particular the law
of search and seizure, at greater length below. The point to be aware of here
is that, as a general rule, the police are obliged to have a warrant in order to
obtain any information in which a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. However, federal and provincial privacy protection statutes do allow,
in some circumstances, for the release of information in accordance with the
terms of the statute. In a number of cases, police have discovered in various
ways that child pornography has been downloaded to a particular IP address.
They have then, instead of obtaining a search warrant, asked the ISP for the
name and address of the person to whom that IP address had been assigned.
The effect, of course, is to provide evidence that that is the person who
committed the offence of possessing child pornography.
9.41 A number of lower courts have faced this situation. Although no clear
consensus has yet emerged, the tendency is for courts to find the evidence
admissible1. Two factors have most frequently settled the analysis, in one
direction or another. The first is the question of whether an accused has a
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the information revealed. The argument
against admitting the evidence is that conversations in a chat room can be
private communications, and therefore that the situation is analogous to an
interception. It is clear in Canadian law that there is a high expectation of
privacy in such private communications, and so if that analogy is accepted then
the warrant requirement would certainly be enforced. Most courts which have
allowed the evidence to be used, however, have downplayed the analogy
between releasing a name and investigative techniques such as interception.
Instead, they have concluded that the only information revealed by the ISP is
the accused's name and address, and that a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his or her name and address.
1

R. v Kwok, [2008] O.J. No. 2414 (Ont.C.J.) found that the evidence was not admissible, as
did the court in R. v Cuttell, 2009 ONCJ 471. Cases admitting the evidence include R. v Ward,
2008 ONCJ 355 (Ont.C.J.); R. v Friers, 2008 ONCJ 740 (Ont.C.J.); R. v Trapp, 2009 SKPC
5; and R. v Wilson, [2009] O.J. No. 1067 (Ont.C.J.).

9.42 One might argue that a mere matter of timing should not be given the
significance many courts do. In the case of an interception, the name of the
person is identified, and then private information is obtained: in the case of an
IP address, the private information is obtained first, and then the name. The
net effect is the same - linking the particular information to a particular person
- and so it is hard to see a principled reason that a different result should
follow in the two cases. None the less, that is the tendency to date.
9.43 The second factor which has been in play is the existence of a contract
between the ISP and the customer, and the statutory provision allowing
non-consensual disclosure of information 'for the purpose of enforcing any
law of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for
the purpose of enforcing any such law.'1 This is the ironic effect which privacy
protection legislation has had on individual privacy protection. This provision
might merely be intended to shield the ISP from liability to its customer if it
were faced with a warrant or other pre-existing legal mechanism requiring it
to disclose personal information without that customer's consent. However,
some courts have relied on provisions of this sort, or on the contractual terms
with the ISP, as creating a new basis for police to obtain the information,
without the need to obtain a warrant. This issue has not yet reached any
appellate-level court in Canada.
1

PIPEDA, s 7(3)(c.l).

New Federal legislation (Electronic Commerce Protection Act)
9.44 While the subject matter in this section is both pending and uncertain, we
feel it is worth mentioning briefly Bill C-27, which is currently tabled before
the House of Commons. It is entitled 'An Act to promote the efficiency and
adaptability of the Canadian economy by regulating certain activities that
discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying out commercial activities,
and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications Act [the Elec278
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tronic Commerce Protection Act]'. The proposed import of the Act is
effectively conveyed via the summary included on the parliamentary website1:
'[The ECPA] prohibits the sending of commercial electronic messages without the
prior consent of the recipient and provides rules governing the sending of those
types of messages, including a mechanism for the withdrawal of consent. It also
prohibits other practices that discourage reliance on electronic means of carrying
out commercial activities, such as those relating to the alteration of data
transmissions and the unauthorized installation of computer programs. In addition, the Act provides for the imposition of administrative monetary penalties by
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, after taking
into account specified factors. It also provides for a private right of action that
enables a person affected by an act or omission that constitutes a contravention
under that Act to obtain an amount equal to the actual amount of the loss or
damage suffered, or expenses incurred, and statutory damages for the contravention.
This enactment amends the Competition Act to prohibit false or misleading
commercial representations made electronically.
It also amends the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
to prohibit the collection of personal information by means of unauthorized access
to computer systems, and the unauthorized compiling of lists of electronic
addresses.
Finally, it makes related amendments to the Competition Act, the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission Act, and the Telecommunications
Act.'
1

Online at: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=
E&Parl=40&Ses=28cMode=l&Pub=Bill&Doc=C-27_l&File=19.

CIVIL PROCEEDINGS1
1

Two general resources for Canadian civil procedure are: L. Abrams and K. McGuinness,
Canadian Civil Procedure Law (2009), LexisNexis; Janet Walker and Garry D. Watson, The
Civil Litigation Process: Cases and Materials (6th edn, 2005), Emond Montgomery.

9.45 Civil cases in Canada are conducted under civil procedure rules (or
'rules of court')2, which exist for every court which has jurisdiction over civil
matters. The vast bulk of civil cases occur in the provincial superior courts,
while certain specialised civil cases in federal jurisdiction are heard in the
Federal Court of Canada. While the procedural rules vary, sometimes widely,
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there is a reasonably coherent and generalised
body of procedural law in place in the country at large. The civil procedure
rules in each jurisdiction govern every aspect of a civil case, from initiating
proceedings through to appeals. While electronic evidence issues may arise at
many stages, they are most pressing at the stage of documentary discovery, on
which this very brief overview will focus3.
2

3

For instance, the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Made under the Courts of Justice Act,
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194; the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, Made by the Judges of the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia; and the Federal Court
Rules.
For a broad overview of electronic discovery issues, see Dan Pinnington, 'Needle in a haystack'
(2006) 15/4 National 42.
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Pre-action
9.46 Canadian law and procedure provide that, in some circumstances,
discovery may take place prior to litigation commencing. Authorisation for
pre-action discovery is found either in specific civil procedure rules (in those
provinces which have a reception date prior to the development of equitable
pre-action discovery in English law) or in the inherent jurisdiction of the court
(for those provinces with later reception dates or where it is specifically
provided for in the rules)1. Two noteworthy brands of effectively pre-action
discovery have emerged of late. One is the 'John Doe' or 'rolling Anton Filler'
order2, essentially an Anton Filler order issued in intellectual property cases
where the plaintiff is aware that copyright or trademark is being infringed but
does not know the identity of the infringers. The order is issued ex parte, and
executed on the infringer's premises or property once its identity is known to
the plaintiff. The second is the Norwich order, which allows a potential
plaintiff to 'demand disclosure of full information from wrongdoers or third
parties that are mixed up in the wrongdoing' prior to beginning an action3. A
Norwich order was recently used to compel two ISPs to disclose the identity of
users who posted allegedly defamatory comments online4.
1

2
3

4

See generally Glaxo Wellcome PLC v Minister of National Revenue (1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th)
433 (Fed. C.A.).
See generally D. Drapeau and J. Cullen, 'Anton Filler Orders and the Federal Court of Canada'
(2004) 17 I.P.J. 301.
Randall W. Block, Michael A. Marion and R. J. Daniel Gilborn, 'Sealed Ex Parte Norwich
Orders: Safeguarding against abuse of the pre-action disclosure remedy', in T. Archibald and
M. Cochrane (eds), Annual Review of Civil Litigation (2003), p 231.
York University v Bell Canada Enterprises, 2009 CanLII 46447 (Ont. S.C.J.).

Discovery
General mechanics of documentary discovery
9.47 Under each set of procedural rules, all parties to a civil action are obliged
to disclose and produce documents which are relevant and not privileged. This
is a unilateral obligation with which each party must comply on its own
initiative, and is typically completed after the close of pleadings. Documentary
discovery generally comprises two steps. First, the party prepares a list of all
relevant documents which the party has or at one time had in its control or
possession1, and provides this list to the other parties as well as filing it with
the court. Second, the opposing parties formally are entitled to inspect and
obtain copies of the relevant and non-privileged documents, though in practice
copies are delivered between and among the parties within specified timeframes. Most civil procedure rules also provide for documentary discovery
from non-parties2. The definition of 'document' or 'record' is invariably very
broad, and the rules' drafters have clearly intended that the term catch
virtually everything that might be considered 'electronic evidence', including
the contents of computers, Blackberries®, Palm Pilots®, PDAs and the
like3. Courts have also shown a willingness to order the production of
metadata where it is demonstrably relevant4.
1

In some jurisdictions the list is just that, a list, but most typically the 'list' takes the form of an
affidavit or sworn statement by the party to the effect that the list contains all known relevant
documents (eg Nova Scotia Rule 15, Ontario Rule 30.03). The latter type of rule often imposes
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2
3

4

the additional requirement that counsel swear that he/she has explained the discovery
obligation to his or her client.
For instance, Nova Scotia Rule 14, Ontario Rule 30.10.
For instance, see CIBC 'World Markets Inc. v Genuity Capital Markets, [2005] O.J. No. 614
(Ont. S.C.J.); Portus Alternative Asset Management Inc. et al, Re (2005), 28 O.S.C.B. 2670
(Ont. Sec. Comm.); Desgagne v Yuen et al., 2006 BCSC 955. As will be seen below, Nova
Scotia's new Rules contain a separate regime for disclosure of 'electronic information'.
Desgagne v Yuen et al., 2006 BCSC 955 at [26]-[34].

Electronic discovery
9.48 The unique issues associated with the discovery of electronic documents,
as well as differing levels of familiarity with technological issues among the bar
and judiciary, has made electronic discovery (or 'e-discovery') a topic of great
interest in Canada in the recent past1. In 2005, a leading Canadian e-discovery
expert commented regarding Canada that 'judicial reasoning exploring the
obligations of the parties to produce electronic evidence remains in its
infancy',2 and in terms of reported cases this is still largely true. For the
moment the struggle for coherence is being played out in the procedural
setting. However, the judiciary and the litigation bar have moved ahead with
developing this area of practice. First, in 2005 the Ontario Bar Association's Discovery Task Force3 developed and issued the Electronic Discovery
Guidelines4, drawing on similar work done in the US5. The objective of the
Electronic Discovery Guidelines was to develop a set of 'best practices' for
counsel involved in electronic discovery, and specifically to: prevent and
resolve discovery disputes; provide for efficient and cost-effective means of
meeting discovery obligations; and suggest technology options that may ease
the process6. The Guidelines are intended to have no binding effect, but simply
to 'provide an appropriate framework to address how to conduct e-discovery,
based on norms that the bench and bar can adopt and develop over time as a
matter of practice.'7
1
2

3

4
5
6
7

The leading text is Todd Burke, Kelly Friedman et al, E-Discovery in Canada (2008).
Susan Wortzman, 'Spoliation, preservation and other "gotchas:" The U.S. & Canadian
Jurisprudence' (2005) 4/2 LawPRO 7, p 8.
The Ontario Bar Association (OBA) is a provincial branch of the Canadian Bar Association,
a voluntary membership organisation which provides support to the legal profession through
legal education and 'representation to government on topics of current concern'.
Available online at: http://www.oba.org/en/pdf_newsletter/E-DiscoveryGuidelines.pdf.
Most notably by The Sedona Conference.
Ontario Bar Association, Guidelines, pp 1-2.
Ontario Bar Association, Guidelines, pp 1-2. Prior to the release of The Sedona Canada
Principles (regarding which see below), the OBA Guidelines were beginning to appear with
some frequency in the case reports; see Sycor Tehcnology Inc. v Kiaer, 2005 CanLII 46736
(Ont. SCJ); Air Canada v Westjet Airlines Ltd., 2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont. SCJ); Spielo
Manufacturing Inc. v Doucet, 2007 NBCA 85; Andersen v St. Jude Medical Inc., [2008] O.J.
No. 430 (Ont. SCJ).

9.49 Second, in 2008 The Sedona Conference, a US-based non-profit research
and educational institute, released The Sedona Canada Principles Addressing
Electronic Discovery1. This document is a compilation of principles and best
practices for addressing the technical, legal and cost issues involved in the
disclosure and discovery of electronic information in civil litigation. It builds
on an earlier document generated by The Sedona Conference for use in the US,
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now in its second edition. However, The Sedona Canada Principles were
formulated by a primarily Canadian panel of judges and lawyers with expertise
in electronic evidence matters (including Colin Campbell J of the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice and Ted Scanlan J of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court), and designed to mesh with the procedural discovery rules of
all Canadian jurisdictions. The overall scheme of the Principles is to encourage
parties to reach agreement, as much as possible, on problems unique to the use
of electronic information in litigation, such as: the preservation of potentially
relevant electronically-stored data; whether it is necessary to search for or
collect deleted or residual data; methods of collection, storage and review;
format, content and organisation of information which is disclosed; and means
to protect privilege, privacy, trade secrets and other confidential information.
1

An annotated version can be found at the E-Discovery Canada Portal, online at:
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/e-discovery-web/law.do?id=18dang=en.

9.50 The Sedona Canada Principles are a leading source of expert commentary on e-discovery and have quickly been adopted for use by litigants and the
courts1. A particularly noteworthy development has been the enactment, by
the Nova Scotia judiciary, of a discrete civil procedure rules dedicated to
e-discovery, or more accurately the disclosure of 'electronic information'. The
new Rule 16 is clearly derived from the Sedona Canada Principles2, and it is
tailored to the realities of e-discovery in a manner that the procedural rules of
other jurisdictions are not, since the latter rely on a broad definition of
'document' and older discovery principles which do not always smoothly
integrate with electronic information3. So, for example, Rule 16 contains
separate definitions of 'document', 'electronic information' and 'storage
medium', and imposes requirements regarding the disclosure of metadata and
the use of 'readily exchangeable' storage media. It essentially imposes three
duties on parties to litigation:
(1)
(2)

to search for relevant electronic information;
to preserve data by making copies of it, which is a continuing obligation
throughout the litigation; and
to disclose relevant information to other parties.

(3)

The clear intention behind the rule is for the parties to reach agreement on a
disclosure regime that will be suited to the specifics of the case in which they
are involved, but in the absence of agreement the Rule also contains a set of
default provisions which can be imposed, as well as a discretionary role for the
court in imposing appropriate disclosure upon motion by a party.
1

2

3

For instance, see Innovative Health Group Inc. v Calgary Health Region, 2008 ABCA 219;
Borst v Zilli, 2009 CanLII 55302; Vector Transportation Services Inc. v. Traffic Tech Inc.,
2008 CanLII 11050 (Ont. S.C.).
And indeed, this is acknowledged in the online annotated version of the new Rules published
by the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society at: http://nslaw.nsbs.org/nslaw/rule.do?id=16.
Though other provinces are expected to enact new rules in the near future.

E-discovery in practice
9.51 While it varies slightly between jurisdictions, 'the general scope of
documentary discovery [in Canada] is extremely broad.'1 The general tendency
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is for the courts to adhere to the traditional Peruvian Guano standard2, and
require the disclosure of documents which tend to have a 'semblance of
relevancy'3 or any bearing on any question which is or might be at play
between the parties. Though there is nothing new about litigation that may
require massive and onerous documentary production4, electronic data accumulates in huge quantities that may be difficult to search, let alone disclose,
and may also be functionally collected and stored within specialised software.
In general terms, Canadian courts have sought to uphold the breadth of the
discovery obligation, applying the broad definition of 'document' so as to
include all manner of electronic data5, and making determinations as to
whether production should extend to data or to the technical machinery which
contains them6.
1
2

3

4

5
6

Janet Walker and Garry D. Watson, The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and Materials, p 709.
Compagnie Financiere et Comtnerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882)
11 QBD 55, CA.
Eastern Canadian Coal Gas Venture Limited v Cape Breton Development Corp. (1995), 141
N.S.R. (2d) 180 (N.S.C.A.). However, the new Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules have
imposed a standard of 'simple' or 'trial' relevancy, seemingly a higher standard designed to
reduce the amount of required disclosure; see Rule 14.
See Peter Kiewit Sons Co. of Canada Ltd. v British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority,
(1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 154 (B.C.S.C.).
For instance Robak Industries Ltd. v Gardner et al, 2005 BCSC 1133 (Master).
In Sourian v Sporting Exchange Ltd., 2005 CanLII 4938 (Ont. S.C., Master), for example, the
court held that the proper way of disclosing the relevant contents of a database was to require
the party to generate a report containing 'the subset of relevant information in usable form',
even though this meant that the party would actually have to create a document - an
order 'significantly more intrusive than ordinary documents production' (at [12]). On this
issue, see Ontario Bar Association, Guidelines, p 7, n. 7.

9.52 If there is a trend, it has been for courts to utilise more frequently their
discretion to decline to order production of documents where to do so would
be needlessly costly or oppressive1, or where the information sought is of
tangential relevance2. For example, in Baldwin ]anzen Insurance Services
(2004) Ltd. v Janzen3, the plaintiff sought production of mirror image copies
of the defendant's hard drives for forensic analysis. Humphries J ruled that
'[wjithout some indication that the application of the interesting technology
might result in relevant and previously undisclosed documents, the privacy
interests of the third parties and the avoidance of unnecessary and onerous
expense militate against allowing such a search merely because it can be
done.'4 In another e-discovery case, the Alberta Court of Appeal5 acknowledged that production of a hard drive may result in unnecessary access to
irrelevant, immaterial and privileged information, and thus should be reserved
for cases where there is clear evidence that a party is deliberately failing to
disclose relevant documents6. It may be that the sheer volume of work and
expense required to complete some kinds of electronic disclosure is indirectly
compelling the courts to tighten up slightly the scope of the production
obligation, though whether this will be true in the long term remains to be
seen.
1

2

Dulong v Consumers Packaging Inc., [2000] O.J. No. 161 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus., Comm. List,
Master) (QL). On cost-shifting, see Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle, 'The costs of
e-discovery: Traditional rules may not apply', in Todd Burke, Kelly Friedman et al,
E-Discovery in Canada, pp 73-92; Karen Groulx, 'The issue of costs' (2005) 4/2 LawPRO 9.
And see Hummingbird v Mustafa, 2007 CanLII 39610 (Ont. S.C., Master).
Park v Mullen, 2005 BCSC 1813.
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3
4

5
6

2006 BCSC 554.
2006 BCSC 554 at [36]. By contrast, however, see Cbadwick v Canada (Attorney General),
2008 BCSC 851 (leave to appeal refused 2008 BCCA 346), where production of a mirror
image was reasonable because the parties disagreed on how a search of the hard drive should
be done and the defendants would otherwise be forced to rely on the assurances of the
plaintiff's computer expert.
Innovative Health Group Inc. v Calgary Health Region, 2008 ABCA 219.
For the latter kind of case, see Vector Transportation Services Inc. v Traffic Tech Inc., 2008
CanLII 11050 (Ont. S.C.).

9.53 The procedural regime in each jurisdiction provides for penalties or
remedies for failure by a party to produce relevant evidence. A good example
is found in Ontario Rule 30.08, which provides that failure to produce a
document could result in loss of ability to use the document at trial, revocation
or suspension of the party's right to discover, or dismissal of the action.
Canadian courts, informed by the Sedona Canada Principles, are also slowly
recognising a duty to preserve evidence, which appears to arise once a party
knows of or should reasonably anticipate litigation1.
1

Doust v Schatz, 2002 SKCA 129. See also Gahtan, Electronic Evidence, pp 122-123. The New
Nova Scotia Rule 16, as noted above, explicitly imposes this duty.

9.54 All of the procedural rules give courts the discretion to order parties to
preserve evidence where necessary1, along with appropriate remedies for
failure to comply2 that may include a contempt order3. Beyond the latter,
however, the doctrine of spoliation is taking on new prominence. Spoliation is
well-established in Canada as an evidentiary doctrine that creates a presumption that the destroyed evidence would have operated unfavourably against the
spoliating party4. However, the law is currently uncertain as to whether
spoliation is simply the mirror image of a duty to preserve5, or whether there
is an independent tort of spoliation6. The leading decision is that of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Spasic (Estate) v Imperial Tobacco Ltd7, which
affirmed the possible existence of a tort of spoliation; however, the elements of
such a tort have not been authoritatively laid out. In any event, parties who
destroy or materially alter evidence will have an array of procedural relief, at
least, available against them. While Canadian courts have shown no inclination to impose the kinds of obligations and sanctions which emerged from
recent and prominent US decisions8, developments are still at an early stage.
1

2

3
4

5

6

7

For example, see HSBC Bank Canada v. Creative Building Maintenance Inc., 2006 CanLII
18361 (Ont. S.C.). Similar powers may, of course, be exercised under an Anton Filler or
Mareva injunction. The leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding Anton
Filler orders, which also dealt in part with electronic information, is Celanese Canada Inc. v
Murray Demolition Corp., [2006] 2 SCR 189.
Cheung (Litigation Guardian of) v Toyota Canada Inc. (2003), 29 C.P.C. (5th) 267 (Ont.
S.C.J.), disallowing reliance on expert reports regarding the missing evidence.
iTrade Finance Inc. v Webworx Inc., 2005 CanLII 9196 (Ont. S.C.).
St. Louis v Canada, [1896] S.C.R. 649. See Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle, 'The
preservation and destruction of electronically stored information in Ontario', in Todd Burke,
Kelly Friedmanet al, E-Discovery in Canada, pp 45-60, esp 51-54.
North American Road Ltd. v Hitachi Construction Machinery Company, Ltd., 2005 ABQB
847, at [16].
See generally British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Spoliation of Evidence, B.C.L.I.
Report No. 34 (November 2004), available online at: http://www.bcli.org/pages/projects/
evidence/spoliation/Spoliation_of_Evidence_Rep.pdf.
(2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 699 (C.A.) at [18]-[22], leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied at (2001), 269
N.R. 394 (note).
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8

Notably Zubulake v UBS Warburg, LLC 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), Zubulake v UBS
Warburg, LLC 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), Zubulake v UBS Warburg, LLC 220 F.R.D.
212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) and Coleman v Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct., March
1, 2005).

9.55 Both the Sedona Canada Guidelines and the OBA Electronic Discovery
Guidelines encourage parties to confer with each other prior to discovery
beginning, in order to attempt to resolve technical issues and agree on a scope
and format for production, among other things1. The courts have endorsed
this idea, and decisions are beginning to appear in which chambers judges
encourage2 or order3 parties to at least attempt to reach agreement on these
issues.
1
2
3

OBA Guidelines, at pp 12-16; Sedona Canada Principles, Principles 5 and 8.
Logan v Harper, 2003 CanLII 15592 (Ont. S.C., Master).
Sycor Tehcnology Inc. v Kiaer, 2005 CanLII 46736 (Ont. SCJ); CIBC World Markets Inc. v
Genuity Capital Markets, 2005 CanLII 3944 (Ont. S.C.).

Confidentiality and legal professional privilege
9.56 Privilege concerns are a live matter in any civil case, but Canadian case
law is beginning to reflect some of the particular issues that arise with
electronic evidence1. Some are simple evidentiary issues, such as whether the
opening of an email from a third party's email account amounts to waiver of
privilege2. In one case, a court applied the absolute privilege attaching to
pleadings (ie privilege as against defamation claims), and ruled that the
privilege applied to metadata in the pleadings3.
1

2

3

See generally Susan Wortzman and Susan Nickle, 'Privilege', in Todd Burke, Kelly Friedman
et al, E-Discovery in Canada, pp 61-72.
Dublin v Montessori Jewish Day School of Toronto, 2006 CanLII 7510 (Ont. S.C., Master);
Eizenshtein v Eizenshtein, 2008 CanLII 31808 (Ont. S.C.).
Big Pond Communications 2000 Inc. v Kennedy, 2004 CanLII 18758 (Ont. S.C.).

9.57 A common problem arises from hard drives or networks which are full
of inter-mingled communications, usually via email, that might contain a mix
of communications between solicitor and client, and discussions between the
employees of a corporate party that might contain communications protected
by litigation privilege. While the problem is not unique to the electronic
context, 'e-discovery does, in some circumstances, involve a heightened or
special risk of inadvertent or unintended disclosure of privileged information.'1
1

OBA Guidelines, p 16.

9.58 Designing means by which disclosure can be accomplished while avoiding inadvertent release of privileged material can be challenging1. For that
matter, combing voluminous electronic files for relevant material (possibly
including drafts and metadata) can be costly and expensive. In Air Canada v
Westjet Airlines Ltd2, the plaintiff argued that continuing with a previouslyagreed mode of electronic document review was too costly and onerous, and
requested that it be permitted to deliver documents without review for
relevance or privilege; any 'inadvertent' production of privileged document
was requested not to constitute waiver3. The court was 'unmoved'4 by the
plaintiff's cost concerns, and dismissed the motion on the basis that solicitor285
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client privilege should not be 'readily sacrificed to the interests of expediency
or economics.'5
'

2
3
4
5

For a discussion in the US context, see Daniel R. Rizzolo, 'Legal privilege and the high cost of
electronic discovery in the United States: Should we be thinking like lawyers?', Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 6 (2009), pp 139-152.
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont. SCJ).
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont. SCJ), [1].
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont. SCJ), [16].
2006 CanLII 14966 (Ont. SCJ), [15].

9.59 What is clear is that the courts will guard the privilege of litigants
assiduously and provide significant relief where violations are found. In one
case1, the plaintiff seized the contents of a computer server belonging to the
defendants. The court found that the only effective remedy was to stay the
action. In another2, servers formerly belonging to a defendant were purchased
by a third party and came into the possession of solicitors for the plaintiff. One
of the solicitors reviewed various emails on the server, and realised that a
number of them were likely to be subject to solicitor-client privilege. The court
found the solicitors had, in fact, seen some of the privileged emails and
removed several of the solicitors from the record as a remedy. The most
famous case of this kind is probably Celanese Canada Inc. v Murray
Demolition Corp.3, where the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a major
Canadian law firm removed as solicitors of record for the plaintiffs after one
of the lawyers acting for the plaintiff disclosed privileged documents, seized
during the execution of an Anton Filler order, to the client and their experts.
1
2
3

Autosurvey Inc. v Prevost, 2005 CanLII 36255 (Ont. S.C.).
National Bank Financial Ltd. v Daniel Potter, 2005 NSSC 113, affd 2006 NSCA 73.
[2006] 2 SCR 189.

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Pre-trial
9.60 In Canada today, most laws of criminal procedure are derived from the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was enacted in 1982. These
rights have constitutional status, with the result that all other laws, including
those governing police investigative techniques, must comply with Charter
standards. To fully understand today's situation, however, it is necessary to
understand the pre-Charter rules with regard to the gathering and admission
of evidence. Prior to 1982, there were effectively no rules in Canada preventing
the use of illegally-obtained evidence. Evidence had to comply with the rules of
admissibility discussed above, but the fact that it might have been obtained
through illegal means was effectively irrelevant. As a result, there was no limit
on the techniques police could use to gather evidence, short of actions such as
beating an accused, and even then any statements would only be inadmissible
because they were not reliable.
9.61 The one pre-Charter exception to this rule concerned electronic surveillance. When legislation governing interception was introduced in 1974, it was
recognised that it posed a far greater threat to privacy than other investigative
methods of the time. The details of the scheme are reviewed below, but in
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general terms the Criminal Code made the interception of private communications illegal, with exceptions for certain police investigative techniques. In
addition, a rule was added making interception evidence inadmissible unless it
was obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Code1. The pre-Charter
situation was that there were some rules governing police investigative
techniques, but if the police did not comply with those rules, any evidence
gathered was likely to be admissible none the less, except in the case of
electronic surveillance.
1

Note that this latter rule no longer exists: see the discussion at 9.60 ff.

9.62 When the Charter was enacted in 1982, it created a number of individual
rights that affected police investigative techniques. The most important for this
discussion are set out in s 8, which guarantees the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, and s 24(2), which provides a potential
remedy of exclusion of evidence. Most of the rest of this part will be devoted
to s 8, while s 24(2) is discussed at 9.91 ff. Several significant facts must be
noted in order to understand electronic (or other) evidence-gathering in
Canada today. First, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that an
'unreasonable' search in s 8 means an illegal search: one not authorised by
statute or common law1. Therefore, any search for which there is no legal
authority will violate the Charter. Second, a 'search' is defined as anything
which impinges on a person's reasonable expectation of privacy2. The concept
of 'reasonable expectation of privacy' will be discussed at greater length below,
but this definition means that 'search' includes not only techniques such as
searching the pockets of an accused, but also listening in to a telephone
conversation or placing a device on a car to track its movements. Third, a
warrantless search is prima facie an unreasonable search and a Charter
violation3.
1
2
3

R. v Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3.
R. v Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 at 533.
Hunter v Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.

9.63 Further, in Hunter v Southam1, one of the earliest Charter decisions, the
court laid down rules regarding the issuing of warrants. A warrant must be
issued by a person capable of acting judicially (typically a judge or justice of
the peace), and must be issued prior to the search. The warrant must be based
on reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and that
the search will produce evidence relating to that offence, both of which must
be proven on balance of probabilities, on oath, to the person issuing the
warrant. In sum, the Charter states that any search conducted without a
warrant prima facie violates an accused's s 8 rights, and that warrants should
only be issued in compliance with the Hunter standards. The standards are not
absolute requirements; they are a benchmark for the appropriate balance
between the privacy interests of the individual and the interests of the state. As
either factor takes on greater or lesser importance, the warrant requirements
might become more or less stringent.
1

Hunter v, Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. In Canada, authority over property and civil
rights is given to the provinces by virtue of s 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The
following is a list of the electronic commerce acts adopted by each province or territory:
Electronic Transactions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-5.5 [Alberta]; Electronic Transactions Act,
S.B.C. 2001, c. 10 [British Columbia]; The Electronic Commerce and Information Act, S.M.
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2000, c. 32 [Manitoba]; Electronic Transactions Act, S.N.B. 2001, c. E-5.5 [New Brunswick];
Electronic Commerce Act, SNL2001, c. E-5.2 [Newfoundland & Labrador]; Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 26 [Nova Scotia]; Electronic Commerce Act, S.O. 2000, c. 17
[Ontario]; Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c. E-4.1 [Prince Edward Island];
Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.Y. 2000, c. 66 [Yukon].

9.64 Against that background, the court has assessed various police investigative techniques, including various electronic methods of evidence gathering.
Among the early methods reviewed were the statutory schemes governing the
use of surveillance to intercept telephone calls or other private communications (which conformed to the Charter)1, and the use of body packs surreptitiously to record conversations between a police informant and others (which
did not)2.
1
2

R. v Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421.
R. v Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.

9.65 The Canadian interception law is set out in a portion of the Code entitled
'Invasion of Privacy'. In broad terms, the Code makes the electronic interception of private communications1 illegal, but then makes exceptions for some
police investigative techniques. In particular, the police can apply for a warrant
- referred to as an authorisation - to intercept the private communications of
particular persons2. These requirements for authorisations not only comply
with the Hunter standards noted above; they include additional restrictions
making them less available than most other types of warrants3.
1

2

3

Note that the definition of 'private communication' includes cell telephone calls if they are
encrypted, but not otherwise: s 183.
Electronic surveillance case law in Canada is very complex, and there has been a great deal of
litigation over issues such as whether a particular person was or was not a 'known' person who
should have been named in the authorisation (R. v Chow, 2005 SCC 24), specifying the places
to which the subject 'resorts' (R. v Thompson, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111), the limits involved in
intercepting pay telephones (Thompson), interception of privileged communications (R. v
Robillard, (2000), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Que.C.A.), and many others. The statutory scheme
also contains many details not mentioned here, such as the use of interception in emergency
situations without a warrant. Those details are beyond the scope of this chapter, and the
interested reader should consult a specialist work, such as the looseleaf volume by Robert W.
Hubbard, Peter M. Brauti and Scott K. Fenton, Wiretapping and Other Electronic Surveillance: Law and Procedure (2000).
It is important to note that despite these restrictions, electronic surveillance is - or at least has
been — quite common in Canada. A study by the Law Reform Commission of Canada found
that police in Canada applied for authorizations at 20 times the rate of police in the US: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Electronic Surveillance (1986), Ottawa: LRC, p 10.
However, that study predated many of the Charter cases discussed in this section, so it is
possible that the actual rate of use in Canada is lower now.

9.66 First, an application for an authorisation must be made to a judge: a
justice of the peace has no jurisdiction. Also, authorisations can only be used
in the investigation of certain relatively serious listed offences. These offences
are not limited to ones in the Criminal Code, but also include some offences in
the Bankruptcy Act, the Competition Act, the Export and Import Permits Act,
the Security of Information Act, and others. Limiting this investigative
technique to listed offences does restrict its use to some extent, though the list
of offences has steadily increased since the provisions were first introduced. In
addition, there are two pre-conditions to the granting of an authorisation
beyond the Hunter standards. First, the judge must be satisfied that granting
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the application is in the interests of justice1. Second, 'investigative necessity'
must be shown. This criterion is not an absolute 'last resort' requirement, but
does require that there be 'practically speaking, no other reasonable alternative
method of investigation, in the circumstances of the particular criminal
inquiry'2.
1
2

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 186(l)(a).
R.v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, at [29].

9.67 The body pack provisions in the Invasion of Privacy section, on the other
hand, were found to violate the Charter as they stood. The notion behind the
provisions had been that as long as one of the parties to a private conversation
agreed to the recording, then the taping was by consent and no warrant was
needed. In practice, of course, this meant that police could audiotape private
communications whenever they used an informant or undercover officer,
without judicial pre-authorisation. In R. v Duarte, the court held that this
scheme fell short of the minimum standards required by Hunter, and so
violated the Charter. The court below had held that interception and recording
by consent was acceptable, on the theory that anyone talking to another
always risked that that person would repeat the conversation to the police: the
tape did not increase that risk, it merely made the record of the conversation
more reliable. The Supreme Court held that that reasoning missed the real
issue:
'The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the potential, if left
unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our communications will remain
private. A society which exposed us, at the whim of the state, to the risk of having
a permanent electronic recording made of our words every time we opened our
mouths might be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which
privacy no longer had any meaning'1.

The issue was not the use of this technique, but the use of it by the police at
their sole discretion. As a consequence, even 'consent' electronic surveillance
now also requires that the police obtain an authorisation from a judge.
1

R. v Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at [22].

9.68 Following Duarte, the next issue which arose for the court was the use
of surreptitious video recording. The invasion of privacy provisions in
the Code did not touch on this issue at all - neither to make it illegal nor to
provide authorisations allowing police to do it. In Wong1, the police were
investigating illegal gambling conducted in a hotel room. Deciding that they
could not investigate through undercover officers, the police installed a camera
in an adjoining room and videotaped the gambling: as no warrants were
available to authorise this, they did not obtain one. The Crown argued that as
there was no statutory prohibition on video surveillance, the police were
entitled to use it at will, an approach which the court said 'wholly misunderstands Duarte'2. The correct conclusion, the court held, was that in the absence
of judicial pre-authorisation, the search failed to comply with the Hunter
standard and violated the Charter. If there was no method of judicial
pre-authorisation, then the police could not use the technique at all, rather
than use it at will. Shortly thereafter, the court decided Wise3, in which the
police had, without a warrant, placed a tracking device on the accused's car in
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order to follow the movements of the vehicle. The court concluded with no
difficulty that this was an unconstitutional search. Of interest was the
observation by the court that the privacy interest at issue with regard to
tracking devices was low, on the basis that there is a reduced expectation of
privacy in a vehicle, and that the search was less intrusive than electronic audio
or video surveillance. Cory J for the majority expressed the view that if there
were to be legislation authorising tracking devices, it could be based on a lower
standard than the Hunter requirement of reasonable grounds.
1
2
3

R. v Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36.
R. v Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at [28].
R. v Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527.

9.69 In the wake of these decisions, new warrant provisions were introduced,
which can conveniently be considered in four categories. First, the Code now
permits the police to place a tracking device on a vehicle: rather than requiring
reasonable belief to do this, the warrant is available on the lower standard of
reasonable suspicion1. Second, the Code permits the police to place a dial
number recorder (DNR) on a suspect's telephone. This device will not intercept
communications, but will record the activity occurring on the telephone
keypad: this warrant is also available on the lower reasonable suspicion
standard2. Third, warrants for video surveillance are available: although these
provisions are not in the 'Invasion of Privacy' section, the video surveillance
warrants incorporate the rules governing audio surveillance, including those
limiting the offences which can be investigated in this way3.
1
2
3

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s 492.1.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s 492.2.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s 487.01(4), (5).

9.70 Finally, Parliament also introduced the 'general warrant' provisions into
the Code, provisions which are true to the letter of Duarte and Wong but
contrary to its spirit. Those cases held that in the absence of specific
authorisation, police should not use particular investigative techniques: it was
a message of restraint. The effect of the general warrant provisions is to
remove those restraints and permit judges to authorise literally any investigative technique: the provision allows police to seek a warrant to 'use any device
or investigative technique or procedure or do any thing'1. General warrants are
only available on criteria slightly stricter than the Hunter standards: only a
judge has jurisdiction to issue the warrant, and it must be in the interests of
justice to do so.
1

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s 487.01(1).

9.71 The current situation in Canada with regard to electronic investigative
techniques is that warrantless searches will (subject to the issue of reasonable
expectation of privacy, to be discussed below) violate the Charter, but with a
warrant anything is permissible. Two final points should be made, however.
9.72 The first is that the array of warrant provisions creates much potential
for confusion, since some are available from justices of the peace and some are
not, some require reasonable belief while for others reasonable suspicion is
sufficient, and some impose additional requirements - the 'interests of justice'
and investigative necessity for video and audio surveillance, and just the
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'interests of justice' for general warrants - beyond the Hunter standards which
apply to ordinary search warrants. The result is that police and others can be
confused over which warrant to seek in which situation1. Consider a cell
telephone for example: police wishing to intercept communications through it
must proceed under a surveillance authorisation, which is only available if
investigative necessity is satisfied, but could obtain a dial number recorder
warrant on mere reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, if the objective is to
determine when an accused made telephone calls and which towers the calls
were routed through (to locate the telephone at the scene of a crime) then an
ordinary search warrant is sufficient2. Similar issues arise over email: an
ordinary search warrant is sufficient to seize and examine a computer. Indeed,
the Code specifically notes that anyone with a warrant to search a computer is
entitled to use the computer to search any data available to the system3. Search
warrants can also be used to obtain the records of an ISP, which might give
access to email communication: but this raises a number of questions, such as
whether these messages should be seen as more akin to private communications like those protected by the Invasion of Privacy provisions. Similar
problems occur where a webcam or VOIP communication is made over the
computer: is an ordinary search warrant the proper method to monitor or
discover that data after the fact?4.
1

2
3
4

See for example R. v Gerrard, [2003] CarswellOnt 421 (Ont.S.C.), where the police obtained
a tracking warrant under s 492.1, which is available on standards lower than the Hunter ones,
but also felt they needed a higher standard general warrant to have authority to remove the
accused's car and place the tracking device in it.
R. v Cole, [2006] OJ. No 1402.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s 487(2.1) also explicitly permits printing out and seizing
copies of anything contained on the computer.
See the discussion in James A. Fontana, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada (6th edn,
2005), noting that case law concerning the use of warrants for computers has not clearly
distinguished between whether the computer is the repository of information, the means by
which the crime was created, or an instrument of communication. See also Department of
Justice, Emails: Considerations for Criminal Law Policy (2005), Ottawa: Department of
Justice, available online at http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/lawful-access/doj_-_ema
il.ppt#312,14; and Dominique Valiquet, Telecommunications and Lawful Access: I. The
Legislative Situation in Canada (2006), Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research
Service,
available
online
at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0565-e.html.

9.73 Second, this legislative mix includes some very particular provisions,
such as tracking warrants, and very general ones, like general warrants. This
raises the question of which approach is best equipped to protect society and
individual liberty while keeping pace with technological change. The general
warrants provide a more flexible approach, but a provision which literally
authorises 'any thing' must be of concern. On the other hand, more specific
provisions risk being left behind. In Wise1, for example, an important rationale
for the lower authorisation standard was that tracking devices were unsophisticated and could not track the movement of the vehicle. With the advent of
Global Positioning System (GPS) and laptop computer mapping software, that
is exactly what tracking devices today accomplish, but they are still authorised
on the lower standard of reasonable suspicion2.
1
2

R. v Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527.
Note as well that since 1992, when DNR warrants were created, the types of activities
performed on telephone keypads have increased dramatically - entering credit card numbers,
PINs, etc. See the discussion in Steve Coughlan and Marc S. Corbet, 'Nothing plus nothing
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equals . . . something?: A proposal for FLIR warrants on reasonable suspicion' (2005), 23
C.R. (63) 239.

9.74 There is one final issue about which more should be said: reasonable
expectation of privacy. It has already been noted that reasonable expectation
of privacy enters into the court's analysis of what level of protection
individuals should receive: the lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle leads
to tracking device warrants on a lower standard but, for example, the
particularly high privacy interest in one's own DNA leads to the incorporation
of additional protections into the DNA warrant provisions of the Code1. The
concept of 'reasonable expectation of privacy' also arises at an earlier point in
the analysis, however, in a way which is worth observing in the context of
electronic evidence. A search is defined as any investigative technique which
impinges on a reasonable expectation of privacy: conversely, therefore, if an
accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy, then any investigative
technique used was not a search, and so was not an unreasonable
search. Courts have from time to time used this method of reasoning as a way
to avoid finding a Charter violation.
1

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; see ss 487.04-487.091 as well as R. v S.A.B., [2003] 2
S.C.R. 678 and R. v Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15.

9.75 This was one of the Crown's arguments in Wong, the video surveillance
case: since the accused had invited others into his hotel room to gamble, he had
no reasonable expectation of privacy. The court rejected the argument in that
case, and importantly noted that a 'risk assessment' was the wrong approach
to take. If the issue was whether privacy as a practical matter was at risk,
advancing technology would mean that individuals would only have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when sitting silently in the dark in the cellar.
The question, the court said, was what level of privacy the individual is entitled
to expect1. Over a series of cases, the court distinguished between territorial,
informational and personal privacy, though more than one can be relevant in
a single situation - DNA testing involves both informational and personal
privacy, for example. This is still very much a developing area of law in
Canada and the interplay between the various types of privacy has not yet been
clearly worked out.
1

The argument failed as well in R. v Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, where the court rejected the
claim that body pack recording was no different from the risk that the informant might repeat
the conversation.

9.76 Once or twice, though, the 'no search since no privacy' argument has
succeeded. The court has decided that police are entitled to obtain the power
consumption records of an accused without a warrant, since no privacy
interest is at risk1. More recently, they have decided that police can train a
Forward Looking Infrared Scanner (FLIR) at the home of a suspect without the
need for a warrant, since there is no privacy interest in the pattern of heat
escaping from one's house2. This latter decision has created some confusion in
lower courts as to whether other investigative techniques require a warrant or
not, including Digital Recorder Ammeters (which are attached to the power
lines leading into a house to track the cycling pattern of electricity use) and,
somewhat surprisingly, drug sniffing dogs3.
1

R. v Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281.
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2
3

R. v Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R 432.
The highest-level decision to date on digital recording ammeters is R. v Gomboc, 2009 ABCA
276, which concludes that they do infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Supreme Court of Canada did, after several years of inconsistent provincial court of appeal
decisions, confirm that the use of drug sniffing dogs is a search: R. v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC
18.

9.77 Oddly, then, given the current legislative scheme, novel electronic
methods of investigation either are not searches at all and so are completely
unregulated, or are searches which can only be authorised under the stricterthan-usual standards for general warrants.
9.78 Warrants are normally granted on an ex parte basis1, which means that
it will not usually be until trial that the accused has an opportunity to challenge
the basis upon which the warrant or intercept authorisation was issued2. If it
is found that the warrant ought not to have been issued, that will render
whatever search was made a warrantless one which, as noted above, makes it
prima facie an unreasonable search violating s 8 of the Charter and potentially
entitling the accused to a remedy.
1

2

The SCC noted in R. v S.A.B., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678, 2003 SCC 60, dealing with DNA
warrants, that judges have the discretion to conduct an inter partes hearing in an application
for such a warrant, but no warrant provisions in Canada require inter partes hearings.
In principle it might be open to seek a review before a judge other than the trial judge, but the
Supreme Court has said the preferred course is to make the challenge at trial: see R. v Garofoli,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421.

9.79 The standard on review is whether there was any basis upon which the
authorising judge could have granted the warrant: the reviewing judge does
not substitute his or her discretion on the question of whether the warrant
should have been issued. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for an accused to
show fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the police in obtaining the
warrant or authorisation in order to have the warrant quashed. If fraud or
misrepresentation is shown, however, that material is excised and the question
is whether the remaining material provided a basis to issue the warrant1. On
the other hand, where errors in the affidavit are minor technical ones made in
good faith - but only then - the affiant is permitted to 'amplify' the affidavit
in cross-examination: that is, the errors can be corrected and the new
information can be relied upon in the review2. The court has held that this is
the appropriate balance between requiring pre-authorisation, but not permitting form to triumph over substance. This rule was handed down in the
particular context of electronic surveillance, but it has been taken to apply to
warrant provisions generally, and therefore should apply to any other potentially electronic searches, such as DNRs, tracking devices or general warrants,
and indeed to ordinary search warrants.
1
2

R. v Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421.
R. v Araujo, 2000 SCC 65.

9.80 In challenging an intercept authorisation, an accused does not have an
automatic right to cross-examine the affiant: rather, leave to cross-examine
must be obtained from the trial judge. The trial judge has discretion, but
should allow cross-examination when it is necessary to enable the accused to
make full answer and defence. In particular, the accused must show a
reasonable likelihood that cross-examination will tend to discredit the exist293
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ence of one of the preconditions to the authorisation. When cross-examination
is permitted, it is limited to questions directed to establish that there was no
basis for granting the authorisation1.
1

R. v Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, and recently re-affirmed in R. v Fires; R. v Using, 2005
SCC 66.

Disclosure
9.81 As in many other areas of the criminal law, the rules about disclosure of
evidence are governed by the Charter. The Crown has an obligation to disclose
to an accused all relevant evidence in its hands, whether the Crown intends to
use the evidence or not: this obligation arises from the accused's right to a fair
trial, which is contained within s 7 of the Charter. This rule supersedes any
individual rules which might otherwise apply to electronic evidence. The
intercept provisions in the Code, for example, were initially drafted to provide
that all materials relied upon to grant an authorisation would be sealed and
would not normally be given to the accused: now, the opposite is true and the
ordinary rule for intercepts is the same Charter presumption of full disclosure
that applies to all other evidence1.
1

See R. v Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421; R. v Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469; and s 187 of the
Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

9.82 None the less, the duty to disclose does not extend to privileged material,
and in the case of warrants, the police might have relied upon information
obtained from confidential informants. Informer privilege is recognised in
Canadian law, and so the materials disclosed to the accused are first edited by
the prosecutor to remove information which might identify a confidential
informant. The Code legislates this rule for wiretaps, as well as allowing
editing to protect ongoing investigations, undercover officers or techniques,
and innocent persons1. If too much information is edited from the supporting
material, however, the accused might be entitled to a remedy based on a breach
of the right to disclosure. This is independent of the question of reviewing a
warrant discussed below, and the remedy might be granted even if the material
disclosed was sufficient to justify the issuance of the authorisation2.
1
2

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 187(4).
R. v Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469.

9.83 The disclosure obligation is also limited to relevant material. Accordingly, an accused charged with an offence is not entitled to know whether he
or she has been subject to interception other than that relating to the particular
offence charged1.
1

R. v Chaplin, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727.

9.84 There are also some special rules regarding electronic evidence. First, by
statute, there might be an obligation to disclose some methods of investigation
even if no charges have been laid. Section 196 of the Code requires that the
person whose communications were intercepted must be notified of the
interception at most 90 days after the authorisation expires, though this period
can be extended where the investigation is continuing, by periods of up to three
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years1. A similar rule applies in the case of general warrants2, though
somewhat surprisingly there is no similar rule for DNR or tracking warrants.
1
2

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 196.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 487.01(5.1).

9.85 There can also be technical issues around disclosure of electronic
evidence. In R. v Cassidy1, for example, the accused was charged with
possession of child pornography and the police had seized his computer hard
drives. They examined the hard drives with two software programs, one of
which was available only to the police, the other of which was commercially
available but cost (including training) CN$4,500.00. In that particular case the
court concluded that the proper method of disclosure was to provide the
accused with a copy of the hard drive and allow the accused's expert to use the
programs in private at the police station. They left open the possibility that on
some facts disclosure might require providing the accused with the software
and training.
1

(2004), 182 C.C.C. (3d) 294 (Ont.C.A.).

9.86 Exactly what result will flow if the Crown fails to disclose evidence
which it should is a complex question in Canadian law, since the issue depends
on what Charter remedy is appropriate and just in the circumstances. If the
non-disclosure is discovered at a pre-trial stage, the only remedy is likely to be
an order for disclosure. Even mid-trial, in most cases the remedy is only likely
to be an adjournment accompanied by an order for disclosure1. If the
non-disclosure does not come to light until after the trial, then an appeal court
might do anything from deciding that a conviction must be overturned and a
stay of any further proceedings ordered, to deciding that no remedy at all is
necessary2.
1
2

R. v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38.
The rules around Charter remedies for non-disclosure are quite complex and even inconsistent
in some ways, even over the fundamental question of whether there is an independent right to
disclosure or whether it is just an aspect of the right to a fair trial. The most important cases
have not concerned electronic evidence, but since those cases fall within the general regime of
Charter violations and Charter remedies, the principles apply in that context. More information concerning remedies for non-disclosure can be found in Don Stuart, Charter Justice in
Canadian Criminal Law (4th edn, 2005), under 'Right to a Fair Trial (Right to Make Full
Answer and Defence)'.

Destruction of evidence
9.87 The rules around 'lost evidence' have evolved in a slightly unusual
fashion. Although they now frequently arise in the context of electronic
evidence, such as audiotaped interviews or surveillance footage, they were first
articulated in a case dealing with notes which had been destroyed. Carosella
dealt with a historical sexual assault prosecution1. The complainant in the case
had visited a sexual assault crisis centre seeking advice on how to go about
complaining of an assault which had taken place nearly 30 years previously. A
counsellor at the centre interviewed the complainant, though in accordance
with the centre's policy she took few notes. Further, in accordance with the
centre's policies, those notes were destroyed because of the possibility that they
might later be subpoenaed. As a result, when the accused did eventually seek
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production of those records, the file which the centre produced no longer
contained any record of the interview with the complainant.
1

R. v Carosella, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 80.

9.88 The accused objected to this lack of disclosure1. The Supreme Court of
Canada agreed with the accused and found that there was a violation of the
accused's right to disclosure. In addition - and somewhat extraordinarily - the
court concluded that the only remedy for that non-disclosure was to stay
proceedings against the accused. This decision was difficult to reconcile with
the court's previous cases on both the law of disclosure and on the issue of
when a stay of proceedings was available as a remedy. Many commentators
suggest that the court's real concern in the case was to send a message to sexual
assault crisis centres, and really had little to do with issues of disclosure.
1

Canadian law distinguishes between 'disclosure', which concerns records in the hands of the
Crown, and 'production', which concerns records in the hands of a third party. Generally
speaking, a higher standard is set for production, so that the accused has a higher burden to
show that he or she is entitled to third party records. In addition, there are both common law
rules for production (R. v O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411) and a statutory scheme which
makes the test for production somewhat stricter in the case of confidential records sought in
connection with prosecutions for sexual offences (see ss 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code).
The distinction between disclosure and production is not entirely clear, and Carosella is one
of the cases responsible for muddying that water. Fortunately, a sophisticated understanding
of the distinction and the different sets of rules is not necessary to understand the rules around
lost evidence.

9.89 On the face of it, Carosella seemed to create a draconian rule that cases
had to be stayed when evidence which ought to have been disclosed was no
longer available. In fact the court moved quickly to demonstrate that this was
not the rule. Only a few months after Carosella, the court handed down its
decision in La1. In that case, a peace officer had found a thirteen-year-old
runaway they had been looking for and had interviewed her about the driver
of the car in which she was found. The driver was known to the police to be
a pimp, and in fact was later charged with sexual assault against the girl. The
officer who had interviewed the girl testified that she had told a few lies on the
tape. However, by the time the accused was charged and obtained disclosure,
the tape recording itself could no longer be found and so was not given to the
accused. He applied, on the basis of Carosella, for a remedy. The court found
that he was not entitled to a remedy, and indeed that there had been no breach
of his rights in the first place. The tape was relevant, they acknowledged, and
the accused did have the right to disclosure of it. The court carried on to find,
however, that the Crown could not disclose what it did not have. The Crown
ought to preserve relevant evidence. Where it could not do so, though, it would
not automatically mean that the right to disclosure had not been satisfied. They
held that where 'the evidence has not been destroyed or lost owing to
unacceptable negligence, the duty to disclose has not been breached'2.
1
2

R. v La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680.
R. v La, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 at [20].

9.90 This rule applies, obviously, beyond issues of electronic evidence, but it
has been specifically applied in that context. In Mymryk, for example, the
accused was charged with assaulting a police officer after he threw his shoe
either 'at' or 'to' the officer, depending on whose testimony one accepted1. The
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offence occurred at the police station as the accused was being booked and was
being required to remove his shoelaces: the entire incident would have been
captured on a security camera. Those tapes were not generally prepared for
evidence-gathering purposes, and so they were re-used after six months. In
Mymrik, defence counsel only became aware of the existence of the tape and
requested disclosure of it two days after it had been erased. The trial judge
found that the Crown's explanation for the loss was not acceptable and
amounted to negligence. It ought to have occurred to the police or the Crown
that this particular tape was of unusual significance, and so it ought not to
have simply been treated in accordance with the general policy of re-use.
Failing to pay attention to this issues revealed 'indifference or ignorance' of the
Crown's duty to preserve evidence, as well as a failure to look beyond the
needs of the prosecution to the broader issue of potential relevance to the
defence2. See also S.(C.), where the failure to test a tape recorder either before,
during or after an interview, resulting in the tape being almost entirely
inaudible, amounted to unacceptable negligence3.
1
2

3

R. v Mymrik, (2004), 26 C.R. (6th) 83 (Que.S.C).
R. v Mymrik, (2004), 26 C.R. (6th) 83 (Que.S.C.) at [40]. See also R. v Dulude (2004), 189
C.C.C. (3d) 18 (Ont.C.A.), where a videotape was lost in very similar circumstances. Dulude
was also able to establish a violation of her right to disclosure, but in the circumstances the
tape was unlikely to have been of very much help to her if it had been produced, and so she
received no remedy.
R. v S.(C.) (2004), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 235 (N.S.S.C.).

Trial
9.91 As noted above, the pre-Charter situation in Canada essentially allowed
no exclusion of evidence based on the fact that it had been illegally obtained.
The only exception to that rule was in the case of evidence gathered through
the electronic surveillance provisions in the Code: in that case, if the police had
not complied with the law for interception, the evidence was automatically
excluded. Since the Charter, both of those situations have changed. The
provision in the Code, which previously provided for the inadmissibility of
illegally obtained interception evidence, was repealed in 1993. As a result, the
possible exclusion of all illegally-obtained evidence is now a Charter question1.
1

The court has recently suggested in R. v Buhay, 2003 SCC 30 that there is some possibility of
excluding evidence other than under s 24(2), and that this power predated the Charter. The
power has been little in evidence prior to or since the Charter. There is also theoretically the
ability to exclude under s 24(1) of the Charter, though that remedy is infrequent: see for
example R. v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38.

9.92 When the Charter was introduced, it was recognised that if the rights
guaranteed within it were to have real meaning, then remedies for breach of
those rights had to be available. Although it was agreed that those remedies
needed to include the exclusion of evidence, it was also seen as important that
automatic exclusion of evidence should not follow from a breach of the
Charter. Accordingly, a special provision was incorporated in addition to the
more general remedy provision discussed at 9.81 ff above. Section 24(2) of the
Charter provides for exclusion of evidence gathered in violation of a Charter
right where 'the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute'. The onus is on the applicant to show that the
evidence should be excluded.
297

9.93 Canada
9.93 Over a number of years, the Supreme Court of Canada has developed a
test for exclusion of evidence under s 24(2). In fact, this has been an area the
court has found quite bedevilling, with the result that there has been a constant
evolution in the test. The test was once referred to as the Collins test1, then
later as the Stillman test2; with a significant reworking of the test in 2009, it
seems likely that it will now come to be known as the Grant test3.
1
2
3

R. v Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265.
R. v Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607.
R. v Grant, 2009 SCC 32.

9.94 The central point to understand about the test for exclusion of evidence
is that its focus is not on deterring police conduct, nor even primarily on
remedying the accused's situation1. Rather, the focus is on the reputation of the
justice system: in essence, has there been conduct from which the courts should
disassociate themselves? This decision might have an incidental deterrent
effect, but that is not its purpose. The analysis is prospective, aimed at
preventing further harm to the reputation to the justice system, beyond that
already suffered from a Charter right having been breached.
1

R. v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at [70]: 'Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or
providing compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is
on the broad impact of admission of the evidence on the long-term repute of the justice
system.'

9.95 The court has said, in Grant, that three sets of factors should be taken
into account in deciding the question of exclusion. No one set of factors is
controlling, and all have to be balanced against one another. The three
considerations are:
'(1)

1

the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send
the message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) the
impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused
(admission may send the message that individual rights count for little), and
(3) society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits'1.
R. v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at [71].

9.96 The first set of factors involves considering how severe the breach of
Charter rights has been. A wilful and deliberate violation of rights is to be
regarded more seriously than an inadvertent one, or one made in a situation of
urgency. The second set of factors looks more to the interest of the accused
which has been compromised. Most simply, a body cavity search will be far
more intrusive than a simple frisk, and so it would be easier to forgive the latter
rather than the former. The third set of factors acknowledges that society has
an interest in the guilty being convicted, which must also be considered in
taking into account the system's reputation. Generally speaking, the more
reliable the evidence and the greater its importance to the Crown's case, the
less likely it is to be excluded: that is, there must be a stronger reason to do so
based on the earlier factors. The court seems to have excluded the seriousness
of the offence from playing a significant role in the analysis: both the accused
and society have more 'on the line' when a serious offence has been charged,
so this factor alone does not sway the analysis to one side or the other.
9.97 It is too early to say exactly what patterns might emerge with regard to
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electronic evidence issues and this newly-formulated test. However, the factors
used in the Grant test are not entirely new, having been used in other ways in
previous iterations of the s 24(2) analysis, and so some observations can be
made.
9.98 The use of evidence which conscripts the accused against him or herself
- breathalysers, for example - has been seen in the past as almost certain to
render a trial unfair and therefore to render evidence subject to exclusion. In
large measure this is because Canadian law has seen the right to silence as
particularly important. 'Trial fairness' itself is no longer directly a criterion,
but similar considerations are likely to be seen as having a significant effect on
an accused's Charter-protected interests. That will militate against admitting
such evidence if it has been illegally obtained. This will only follow, however,
where electronic evidence-gathering techniques produce the evidence, as
opposed to turning up previously existing evidence. It has also been taken in
the past to require state involvement in the creation of the evidence. Accordingly, whether interception evidence (for example) impinges on this interest is
likely to depend on whether a state actor is involved in the taped conversation,
or whether it is simply an interception of a conversation between the accused
and another1.
1

See, for example, the discussion in R. v Mooring, 2003 BCCA 199.

9.99 However, it will also be relevant to consider what it is that has led to the
illegality in obtaining the evidence. If police act on an interception authorisation which they believed to be lawful but which is later found to have been
invalidly issued, the evidence might well not be excluded, on the basis that the
police relied on the authorisation in good faith1. Similarly, the impact on
Charter-protected interests will vary with the nature of the investigative
technique used. Privacy has traditionally been seen as a particularly significant
interest, and there is no reason that the reformulation of the s 24(2) test in
Grant should change that. However, privacy is not uniform and so, for
example, individuals are seen to have a particularly high degree of privacy in
their homes, and a relatively lower one in their vehicles. Investigative
techniques which intrude illegally on the home are therefore more likely to
result in exclusion, while those which only intrude on privacy in a vehicle are
less likely to result in exclusion2.
1
2

See, for example, R. v Fliss, 2002 SCC 16.
See, for example, R. v Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, in which the police unlawfully attached a
tracking device to the accused's car, but where the court concluded that the illegally obtained
evidence should not be excluded.
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